

## Matti Moosa's

### *The Crusades: An Eastern Perspective with Emphasis on Syriac Sources\**

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#### Footnotes

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This study treats the events of the Crusades as recorded by Syriac and other Eastern writers, putting special emphasis on the relations of Syrians (and to a lesser extent Armenians, who were the majority of the population in cities like Edessa and the province of Cilicia), their churches and communities, with the Greeks, Franks (Latins), and Turks. The Syrians and Armenians were ill treated by the Byzantine church and state and by the Church of Rome, to which the Crusaders belonged. Most Western writers on the Crusades make little mention of the Syrians and Armenians or the Maronites (a part of the Syrian Church of Antioch), except for a few comments by the twelfth century historian William of Tyre (1).

There are three primary Syriac sources on the Crusades: a history by Patriarch Michael Rabo (d. 1199), the *Chronicle* of the Anonymous Edessan (a monk, d. 1234), and the *Chronography* of the Maphrian (Prelate) Bar Hebraeus (d. 1286). Only this last has survived in its entirety; a condensed Arabic version was published under the title *Tarikh Mukhtasar al-Duwal* [*A Compendious History of Dynasties*] (2).

The first modern writer to use these sources was a Syrian Catholic priest, Ishaq Armala, who relies mainly on a loose translation of the *Chronicle* of the Anonymous Edessan. Occasionally, he interpolates material from Michael Rabo and Bar Hebraeus, in a manner that makes it difficult to ascertain its source. He provides no explanation of historical events and no clarification of the myriad multilingual names. His work would have been far more useful had he simply produced a translation of one of these sources (3).

The earliest of the Syriac sources is the work by Michael Rabo (the surname means "the Great" or "the Elder"). Born in 1126 to a church-oriented Syrian family, he entered the Monastery of Mar (Saint) Barsoum, where he was ordained a priest, and became its abbot in 1165. The next year he was [250] ordained Patriarch of Antioch, holding that office until his death. Although he wrote extensively on church matters, he is best known for his history, which, in the tradition of Greek and Eastern writers before him, extended from the creation of the world to his own lifetime. Each page is divided into three parts: one treats church events, another deals with secular history, and a third describes noteworthy natural occurrences. Only one copy of the manuscript is extant, in the Syrian library of al-Ruha (Edessa), transcribed in 1598 by Bishop Mikha'il al-Urbishi, and some nineteen pages are lost. The manuscript was discovered by a French scholar, Rev. J. B. Chabot, who copied it, translated it into French, and published it in four volumes as *Chronique de Michel le Syrien Patriarche Jacobite d'Antioche*,

1166-1199 (Paris, 1899-1910) (4). This history first became known to Western scholars through a nineteenth-century French translation, based on an Armenian translation requested by Constantine I in 1245. Shuqayr of Sadad, the Syrian bishop of Damascus, translated it into Garshuni (Arabic in Syriac script) in 1759, and several copies of this translation survive today in European libraries.

Michael's account of the Crusades extends from Book XV, Chapter VII to Book XXI, Chapter VIII (pp. 585-719 in Chabot's pagination of the Syriac text). It deals with events from the Franks' arrival at Constantinople in 1097 to the death of Salah al-Din al-Ayyubl (Saladin) in 1193. Michael also offers us significant information about events before the Franks' arrival, especially the origin of the Turks and their penetration of Asia Minor, and the attacks by Armenian marauders against Syrian communities. He is usually careful in giving the titles and authors of Syriac writings like the history of Edessa by Basilius Bar Shumanna, bishop of Edessa (d. 1169), but his haphazard citation of sources poses great problems for the student of history. Although he says at the beginning of Book XIII that he has utilized the history of Ignatius III, Bishop of Melitene, the Syriac sources he has relied on (as in other cases) are lost (5).

The Arabic sources of his work are even more difficult to trace. At the start of Book XV, Chapter XIV, he says he has appended material on the governance of Aleppo from Arabic books found in Athur (in northern Iraq) and near Babylon in lower Iraq, but does not identify these books or their authors (6). The earliest extant Arabic source on the Crusades and contemporaneous events is *Dhayl Tarikh Dimashq [Continuation of the History of Damascus]*, by Abu Ya'la Hamza al-Tamimi, also known as Ibn al-Qalanisi (d. 1160), but it is unlikely that Michael had access to this work. Interestingly, an earthquake that he says rocked Antioch shortly before its capture by the Franks in 1098 is mentioned by Kamal al-Din Ibn al-Adim (1193-1261), in *Bughyat al-Talab fi Taikh Halab [The Ultimate Quest in the History of Aleppo]*. There is no evidence that Michael relied on the *Chronicle* of the Armenian monk Matthew of Edessa (covering events to 1136) or its continuation by Gregory the Priest, [251] though his work mentions many of the same events, and we know little about his use of Latin and Greek sources (7). Steven Runciman says his information "is of little value until he reaches his own lifetime," yet calls him a "careful and conscientious historian whose only strong prejudice was against the Byzantines" (8). Indeed, Michael is not only conscientious but objective, as is shown by his treatment of the Muslims (in Edessa, he says, Muslims and Christians lived together with more amity than either group did with the Greeks) and of his church, whose faults he does not hide (9).

The second Syriac source is the *Chronicle* of the Anonymous Edessan, so called because his name does not appear in the work. According to the late Patriarch Aphram Barsoum, he was a monk from the Mar Barsoum Monastery near Melitene, probably born at Edessa in 1160 (10). His history consisted of two volumes, one covering secular history including the Crusades, the other treating the history of the Syrian Church. Unfortunately, much of the church history has been lost; what remains covers events from 535 to 1207. The secular part extends from the creation to 1234, most likely the year of the author's death. The work has some credibility because the writer witnessed some of the events he narrates, including Saladin's attack on Jerusalem in 1187 and the ensuing atrocities. He appears to be conscientious and objective, but it is difficult to ascertain his sources of information for events he did not witness. It is unlikely that he relied on Michael Rabo, with whom he often differs on dates and details, but he probably had access to some of the same sources, including the library at the Monastery of Mar Barsoum. He may have used Armenian sources, for Edessa was teeming with Armenian emigres in his lifetime; whether he used Arabic sources is less clear. There is only one early copy of his history, transcribed in the fourteenth century; it was published in Lebanon (1904-1914) by the Syrian Catholic Patriarch Aphram Rahmani, and published in Syriac in 1916 by Chabot, who in his introduction acknowledges the assistance of Patriarch Barsoum (11).

Among both Eastern and Western writers, the best known of the Syriac sources is Abu al-Faraj Gregorius Bar Hebraeus (1226-1286), whose encyclopedic writings touched nearly every discipline known in his time. His *Chronography* contains the history of the world from creation to his own time, and is in some sense a

continuation of the *Chronicle* of Michael Rabo, though he disagrees on many points and sometimes takes pains to correct Michael (12). He rarely names his sources or their authors, but a quotation regarding the defeat of Saladin at Tall-Safiya in 1177 suggests that he had read 'Izz al-Din Ibn al-Athlir (d. 1234) or Abu Shama (d. 1266), who cite the same passage. He provides detailed information on Saladin and his feats, probably derived from Arabic sources, and shows only the utmost respect for non-Christian writers.

[252] The Syriac sources discuss not only the Syrians but also several other ethnic groups. Before the Franks' arrival, the Middle East was plagued by consent warfare among the Byzantines (Greeks), Arabs, Seljuk Turks, and Armenians. Relying on the lost history of the Syrian writer Jacob of Edessa (d. 708), Michael describes the Turks' origin in the steppes of Asia, their acceptance of Islam, and their domination of Persia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and Cilicia. He discusses their effort to penetrate Asia Minor in the eleventh century, the weakening of Armenia under the Byzantine emperors, and the collapse of Byzantine power at Manzikert (1071).

In Book XIII, Chapter V (pp. 558-559), Michael Rabo says the Armenians left their homeland in 989 to settle in Cappadocia and then spread to Cilicia and Syria. In Book XV, Chapter XI (pp. 594-595), he says that early in the eleventh century, the Byzantines, after wresting several cities in Cappadocia, Armenia and Syria from the Arabs' control, brought people from Greater Armenia to settle them. But when Turks emigrating from Khurasan filled these regions, Byzantine dominance ended abruptly. Armenia, a Christian country since the third century, had long served as a buffer state between the Byzantine emperors and Persia, their strongest foe. The Arabs had subdued Armenia in 652, but their power waned as the 'Abbasid state decayed. Late in the tenth century, the Byzantines sought to regain their lost territories; many towns and fortresses in northern Syria and Cilicia, including Melitene, Edessa, and Antioch, were restored to Christian control and saw their largely Muslim populations supplanted by Christians, including many Armenians. But early in the eleventh century the situation changed dramatically, due to the Turkish invasion and the expansionist policies of the Emperor Basil II and his successors. The Byzantines' annexation of Armenia was the beginning of the end of their empire in Asia Minor; Armenia was too weak to resist the Seljuk Turks who threatened its eastern border. The Seljuk chief Tughrul Bey had established his rule in Khurasan in 1038, and when he attacked Armenia in 1050, the Turks saw that the Byzantines had left the entire country unprotected. They met with no opposition until they reached Melitene, where they slaughtered so many inhabitants that some escaped death by hiding among the corpses. Michael Rabo says they stayed there ten days, destroying the city and finally burning it, then laid waste to the Monastery of Ibn Jaji and the surrounding countryside (13). (The Turks had invaded Armenia in 1041, but their attack then aimed at the Muslims of northern Mesopotamia near Mosul.) Bar Hebraeus says Ibn Marwan, the Arab governor of Armenia, tried to appease Tughrul Bey with expensive gifts (14), but in 1054-55, Tughrul invaded Armenia again, destroying Berkri and capturing Archesh (Arjish) before being turned back at Manzikert (15). He also says Alp Arslan, Tughrul's nephew and successor as the Seljuk sultan, succeeded in capturing Ani in 1063, a splendid city of [253] 700,000 houses and a thousand churches. He conquered Armenia and destroyed not only Syria and Cilicia but Cappadocia, pillaging the spiritual centers of its capital, Caesarea (16). After beating the Byzantines at Manzikert, the Seljuk Turks spread through eastern Asia Minor, displacing the Armenian inhabitants. Their chief Sulayman, the son of Kutulmish, established the Rum Seljuk state at Iconium, then extended his authority to Cappadocia and Nicea, across the Bosphorus from Constantinople (17).

Michael Rabo's discussion of the Byzantine emperors is scant but objective. He calls Constantine IX (1050-1054) generous and magnanimous, but describes Isaac Comnenus as tyrannical, arrogant, and avaricious. He praises Emperor Alexius Comnenus (1081-1118) as a mighty, wise man who saved Constantinople from the Franks, but avoids commenting on his order that two churches (one Syrian, the other Armenian) be burned, in order to force their congregations to join the Byzantine church (18). He discusses the Byzantines' ill treatment of his church and community since the Council of Chalcedon (451 A. D.) split the universal church into two camps, which remain separate to this day. The Roman Catholic and Greek churches, along with part of the Syrian

Church of Antioch, adopted the decisions of this council; the Coptic, Ethiopian, and Armenian churches and another part of the Syrian church rejected them. The Syrian church suffered so greatly at Chalcedon that by the sixth century, only two bishops were left to tend to its people. Syria and Egypt fell prey to Muslim marauders, and the notion that they opened their gates to the Muslims to avoid persecution by the Byzantines is indefensible. The Muslim Arabs conquered Syria and Egypt by the sword rather than treachery, which Syriac sources do not mention. Indeed, the only statement we have on the Arab conquest of Syria comes from the Syrian Patriarch Dionysius of Tall Mahre (d. 845), who in his history (preserved in part by Michael Rabo), says it would have taken an act of God to save the Syrians from their Byzantine persecutors. Indeed, this persecution continued right up to the time of the Crusades. Of the Emperor Romanus III, under whom Aleppo fell to the Muslims in 1037, Rabo writes:

It never occurred to the Greek tyrants that the ancestors of this king had never stopped persecuting the Christians everywhere. Today they returned to their old habits: They banished the patriarch and the bishops. Thus God defeated them through their enemies and placed them under the control of their haters (19).

The persecution of the Syrians continued during the reign of Emperor Constantine X (1059-1067). Rabo says the Patriarch of Constantinople—probably John VIII, though he is not named—decided to persecute the Syrians and Armenians in that city for refusing to embrace the Greeks' faith. [254] Patriarch Athanasius V and some of his bishops were imprisoned by Byzantine authorities for five months in the Matran Monastery near Melitene, then transferred to Constantinople. The Patriarch died en route; his nephew Bishop Ignatius III (d. 1094) and several other bishops' were taken before the Greek patriarch, then exiled to Macedonia, remaining there until they were released under a general amnesty after the emperor's death. Sadly, the Byzantine emperors treated the Syrians as heretics from the fifth century onward. Some emperors, notably Heraclius in the seventh century, tried but failed to win the Syrians to the Chalcedonian faith, but such efforts only created more dissension, finally leading to Monothelitism and the rise of the Maronite church and community (20). Emperor Manuel I (1143-1180) made a similar effort; when Michael Rabo visited Antioch in 1172-73, the Greeks engaged him in a debate on the Christian faith. Michael does not mention this debate in his history, but it has been described by the Anonymous Edessan and Bar Hebraeus in the biography of Michael Rabo in his *Ecclesiastical History* (21).

The Byzantines' ill treatment of the Armenians also made Armenia an inviting target for the invading Turkish hordes—even more crucial to the cause, since the Armenians had their own state and principalities in Cilicia. The final calamity came when Alp Arslan defeated and captured the Emperor Romanus Diogenes at Manzikert in 1071. The Byzantine chronicler Michaelis Attaliothae summarized the disaster: "Under this emperor almost the whole world on land and sea occupied by the impious barbarians has been destroyed and become devoid of population, for Christians have been slain by them throughout the East, completely crushed and reduced to nothing" (22). The Armenians had resisted Muslim attacks and defended Byzantium's frontiers for years, but Byzantium destroyed their national entity and the strong partition wall built by courageous Armenian warriors, and thus fell at Manzikert to the might of the Seljuk Turks (23).

Michael Rabo and Bar Hebraeus hold the traditional view that the primary cause of the Crusades was the maltreatment of European pilgrims by Muslims in the East, but they do not (like some Western writers) regard the Crusades as a "holy war." Though the Crusaders sought to restore Jerusalem's holy sites to Christian control, it is also true that the Arabs and Turks conquered and plundered in the name of Allah. Some contemporary Muslim historians assert that the Franks were imperialists who seized Eastern lands and threatened their people, but there is little evidence to support this idea. Rabo writes that when the Turks dominated Syria and Palestine, they punished the Christian pilgrims to Jerusalem, beating and humiliating them, and imposing heavy tributes upon them at the city gate, Golgotha, and the Holy Sepulcher. Moreover, they killed these Christians by a variety of means, especially Christians from Rome and elsewhere in Italy. This action provoked [255] the kings and princes in Italy, who gathered armies in their regions and came by sea to Constantinople (24).

Bar Hebraeus says, "... the Franks were filled with rage and, collecting troops, they went first to Spain and took possession of the cities there, shedding much blood. They cut off the ears, lips, and noses of many Arabs and blinded their eyes. Then they marched against Constantinople" (25). Bar Hebraeus had probably read Ibn al-Athir, who began his chronicle of the year 491 A.H./1097 A.D. by recounting the Franks' assaults on the lands of the Muslims, beginning with Spain. He says that in 478 A.H./1085 A.D., the Franks marched against Spain and later occupied Toledo and other parts of the country. In 484/1091, they occupied Sicily, then turned their attention to Africa. Finally, in 490/1097, they marched against Bilad al-Sham (Syria) (26).

Although Michael Rabo and Bar Hebraeus give little information on the arrival of the Franks' organized expeditions, the Anonymous Edessan says that in 1096, many Frankish kings and noblemen, including Bohemond, Godfrey, St. Giles, and Tancred, accompanied by thousands of soldiers, craftsmen, bishops and monks, prepared for war. They marched inland, through Greek territory toward the Hellespont and sent emissaries to Alexius, king of the Rum, urging him to join them and bring provisions. They asked him to order the people under his rule to provide them with grain and fodder for their animals, and he agreed. The Anonymous Edessan says that the Frankish armies crossed the border and some of them reached a certain camp (probably a Byzantine base), but King Alexius urged the Turks in Nicea and those living within his borders to oppose the Franks (this charge of treachery lacks substantiation). The Turks attacked and annihilated the Franks as they came ashore. When the remnants of the Frankish force reached Constantinople, they met with Alexius and other Byzantine leaders and swore mutual oaths of loyalty, and agreed that Alexius would go with them himself by another road through Galatia. The Anonymous Edessan says the Franks and Byzantine forces besieged Nicea, captured it from the Turks, and delivered it to the king of the Rum (Emperor Alexius). They then entered the province of Cilicia, and the whole earth shook before them. They thought of laying siege first against Antioch, the chief city of Syria. After pitching their camp around the city, they closed off the roads and began to kill and plunder throughout the district (27).

Michael Rabo says that an earthquake rocked Antioch while the Franks were dealing with the people of Constantinople. In the foundation of a ruined fortress there supposedly appeared a great temple containing huge brass statues, representing the Franks mounted on horses, armed with lances and swords of brass, and all in chains. The Turkish Seljukid Aghusin (Yaghi Siyan, governor of Antioch) ordered an inquest to determine the truth of this report. But no one seemed to know about it, and no book had mentioned it. So the [256] statues were considered pagan idols and were destroyed. But a blind old woman said, "I have heard old people say that under one of the fortresses are buried, cryptic characters belonging to the Franks, cautioning them not to cross the sea." When the governor heard her words, he regretted having destroyed these characters. He asked her if she knew how they had been made and whether it was possible to make others like them. She answered in the negative, and they killed her (28). The source of this anecdote is unknown, but it is similar to one related by Ibn al-Adim, who died over sixty years after Michael Rabo (29).

According to Michael Rabo, the Franks who came to Antioch included two kings—Mamun (Bohemond I of Taranto, son of Robert Guiscard) and Tanjari (Tancred, nephew of Bohemond I)—and seven princes: Rajil (Roger) of Salerno, Baimond (Bohemond), Baghdawin (Baldwin I of Boulogne, the brother of Godfrey of Bouillon), Gosselin (Joscelin I of Courtenay, first cousin of Baldwin II), Galeran of Le Puisset, Gondoffer (Godfrey of Bouillon), and Salfis (Raymond of St. Gilles, count of Toulouse) (30). When Theodore, the son of Hetoum, who ruled al-Ruha (Edessa) after the murder of Buzan (Seljukid governor of Eclessa, 1087-1094), heard that the Franks had besieged Antioch, he promised to hand the city over to Duke Godfrey. The Franks rejoiced, saying that as Edessa had believed in Christ before Jerusalem, so did the Lord Christ hand it to [them] before Jerusalem. Theodore became governor of Edessa after the death of Buzan in 1094; it is difficult to ascertain his identity, but his name suggests that he was Armenian. According to the Anonymous Edessan, the Seljuk Sultan Abu al-Fath Malikshah, son of Alp Arslan, occupied Antioch in 1087 and then sent Buzan, one of his commanders, to capture Edessa. Buzan stationed some Turks in the fortresses of the city and appointed

Theodore (whom he calls the son of Hatim) as *Curopolates* (guardian of the palace). He usurped the churches of St. John and the Mother of God, in the middle of the city, and converted them into *masjids* (mosques) for the Muslims, complete with a minaret. Seven years later the Christians reclaimed the churches. Godfrey sent his brother Baldwin to rule over Edessa. After a nine-month siege, the Franks finally captured Antioch. Yaghi Siyan fled to Aleppo, but was caught en route by two Armenian brothers who cut off his head and brought it to the Franks (31). The capture of Antioch by the Franks is attributed to the divine power of the Holy Lance (supposedly the same one used to pierce Christ's side at the Crucifixion); the discovery of the Lance was revealed in a dream to the Frankish chief Tancred (32).

Michael Rabo says that after the Franks seized Antioch, they kept the Byzantines away from their churches and expelled their clergy, then installed their own patriarch and had bishops ordained for numerous Syrian cities, including Tarsus, Mopsuestia, Edessa, Tripoli, and Latakia. When they later [257] occupied Jerusalem, they put in place a patriarch who ordained bishops for the cities in Palestine (33). These actions reveal that the Latins were not Christian evangelists seeking to spread the Gospel, but emissaries of the Church of Rome whose purpose was to extend the Pope's authority to the east as the head of all Christendom (34). We shall return to this subject shortly.

Syriac sources say little about the occupation of Jerusalem. Michael Rabo, for example, says simply that the Franks came and occupied Yafa (Joppa) before marching against Jerusalem, then governed by Shahanshah al-Afdal, the son of a certain Badr al-Din al-Jamali of Armenian origin, and Vizir of Egypt from 1094 to 1121 (35). The Franks erected wooden towers at the eastern gate of Jerusalem and occupied it in July 1099, killing many Muslims and filling the city with corpses. They burned the Temple of Hope and all the corpses as well. Godfrey, who became the first king of the Franks, ruled for two years and was succeeded by Baldwin I of Boulogne, who ruled (Michael Rabo says) for four years (36). (In fact, Baldwin ruled Jerusalem from 1100 to 1118.) Bar Hebraeus says that after they seized Antioch, the Franks captured al-Ma'arra, killing over 100,000 souls and pillaging most of the people's possessions. From there they marched against Lebanon and slaughtered a large number of Nusayris (ancestors of the Alawis, who control modern Syria). They attacked other Syrian cities, including Arqa, Tripoli, and Shayzar, whose lord Ibn Munqidh (Majd al-Din Abu Salama Murshid, 1068-1137) submitted to them (37).

After moving against Emessa (Hims) and subduing its lord Janah al-Dawla, they turned on Jerusalem and took it by storm. At the Temple of Solomon, they killed over 70,000 Muslim Arabs and seized the Aqsa Mosque, pillaging its candles and sacred vessels. Godfrey, says Bar Hebraeus, ruled for two years (1098-1100) and was succeeded by Baldwin I, who ruled for seventeen years (38). The Anonymous Edessan puts the number of Muslims killed by the Franks at 30,000; he says that the Muslims expelled the Christian inhabitants of Jerusalem before the invasion of the Franks, who then spread throughout Palestine and the entire district of Galilee (39).

Michael Rabo seems to be objective regarding the Franks' treatment of the native Christians, including his own Syrian congregation. He points out that although the Franks founded their own churches and installed their own bishops in Syria and Palestine, they did not impose the Chalcedonian faith on Christians living in these areas, nor did they oppress those who did not share their belief in the two Natures of Christ. "To the Franks," says Michael Rabo, "all Christians were one, though they might speak different languages. They considered everyone who worshipped the cross a Christian without question." As for the Turks, who controlled much territory, he says they knew nothing of the mysteries of Christianity. In their view, Christianity was a form of falsehood. Yet they did not issue any law to punish those who did not share [258] their faith, nor did they persecute anyone because of his beliefs, "as did the wicked and heretic Byzantines" (40).

Michael Rabo's magnanimous attitude toward the Franks was based on their actions when they had newly arrived in the Byzantine domains. But after they had established a foothold and founded principalities in Antioch, Tripoli, and Edessa, and a kingdom in Jerusalem, some of their princes seemed interested in protecting

their own political interests rather than the well-being of their Syrian and Armenian co-religionists, whom they sometimes mistreated. Furthermore, the Franks did not always agree with the Byzantines, even though they shared the same faith. The Franks had their own religious agenda, to set up church hierarchies in the lands they had seized. Their primary aim was to establish the authority of the Church of Rome and papal supremacy. William of Tyre rejoiced openly when the Latin Patriarch Aimery succeeded in converting the Maronites of Lebanon, regarded by the church as heretics, to Roman Catholicism (41).

The Franks' relationship with the Armenians was different. They could not afford to repeat the Byzantines' mistake of alienating the indigenous Christians, particularly the Armenians, who controlled major regions in Cappadocia and Cilicia. The Franks needed their assistance to buttress their positions in the regions they had captured and to combat their sworn enemies, the Turks. After becoming Count of Edessa in 1098, Baldwin I of Boulogne encouraged Frankish knights to marry many Armenian women of standing. He himself married the daughter of an Armenian noble; Joscelin I of Courtenay married the sister of Leon I, Rouspenid prince of Cilician Armenia, and Baldwin II of LeBourg (who succeeded Baldwin I as ruler of Edessa in 1100) married Morphia, daughter of Gabriel, the powerful Armenian governor of Melitene. But these marriages and the Franks' effort to treat the native Christians differently than the Byzantines had done did not alleviate the antagonism between the two groups. While the Christians sought to throw off the yoke of the Turks, the Franks intended to establish and strengthen their power in the region. The Armenians found to their utter frustration that they had merely exchanged their Turkish overlords for Frankish masters. When Baldwin of Boulogne was invited by the Armenian bishop to become lord of Edessa, he readily accepted this offer (September, 1098). The native Christians of the city, mostly Armenians, received him with alacrity. Their governor shared the people's joy, believing that Baldwin would save him and his city from the Turks (42).

The transition between Baldwin I of Boulogne and Baldwin II of Le Bourg was not smooth. Baldwin II attempted to win the allegiance of the Armenians by offering them better treatment than his predecessor. He showed his political sagacity by establishing amicable relations with the clerics of the Armenian church (43), and supported the Syrian Bishop Abu Ghalib Bar Sabuni, who had [259] rebelled against his own patriarch. For their part, the Armenians joined forces with Baldwin in his campaign against the Turks. On May 7, 1104, when he fought the battle of Harran (Balikh) against Shams al-Dawla Jekermish (Chokurmish), Turkish lord of Mosul, and Sukman ibn Urtuk, Turkish lord of Mardin, most of the casualties were Armenians. The battle was disastrous to the Franks: Baldwin and Joscelin I of Courtenay were taken captive, while Tancred and Bohemond barely escaped to Edessa. Tancred, the Latin regent in the East, sailed for Italy to raise a larger army and return to fight the Turks. Before leaving, he named Richard of Salerno as Count of Edessa. The Syriac sources say Richard was wicked, tyrannical, and avaricious. He humiliated and imprisoned many citizens and committed atrocities, although he knew he was only a temporary ruler, not the true lord of Edessa (44). The Armenians' reaction was predictable: when Tancred was engaged in war with Fakhr al-Muluk Ridwan, the Turkish Seljuk lord of Aleppo (1095-1113), the Armenians of Artah handed their town over to Ridwan because of the grievous tyranny and injustice inflicted on them by the Franks (45). Although Syriac sources do not state what actions by the Franks led to this surrender, Matthew of Edessa describes the Franks' mistreatment of the Armenians in the town of Ablastain in 1105-1106, soon after Richard came to power (46).

The amity between Baldwin II and the Armenians was short-lived; he was motivated by self-interest rather than by any compassion toward his coreligionists. Ironically, he found himself allied with his sworn enemies, the Turks, against his own people. Baldwin was taken captive in 1104 by Sukman, lord of Mardin, but was kidnapped soon after by Jekermish, only to fall into the hands of another Turk, Jawli Saqava, who controlled Mosul briefly in 1107. Jawli was seen as a threat to the Seljuk Sultan Muhammad, who ordered his general Sharaf al-Din Mawdud to capture the city. Fearing the loss of Mosul and pressed for money, Jawli allied with the Franks to fight Mawdud. He left Mosul for Qal'at Jabar on the Euphrates River, taking along, his captive, Baldwin II. At about the same time, Joscelin I, lord of Tall Bashir, gained his freedom by paying the hefty

ransom of 30,000 dinars. Realizing that Jawli was in dire need of money, Joscelin immediately agreed to ransom Baldwin for 70,000 dinars; it was also agreed that Baldwin would release the Muslim captives in Edessa and supply Jawli with men and war material to aid him against his opponents, the Seljuks. (According to Michael Rabo, Joscelin went to Qal'at Jabar and redeemed Baldwin with 30,000 gold dinars) (47). After gaining his freedom in 1108, Baldwin went to Antioch to ask Tancred to give back the principality of Edessa, but Tancred contended that (through Richard of Salerno) he had administered Edessa for four years and could, not give it up. Tancred instructed Richard not to hand the city over; instead, he offered Baldwin weapons and horses and, according to Ibn al-Athir, sought to appease [260] him with an offer of 30,000 dinars (48). Furious, Baldwin left Antioch to meet with Joscelin at Tall Bashir. Tancred followed him there, but realized he would have to fight Baldwin and Joscelin if Baldwin insisted on reclaiming his power in Edessa. The parties failed to resolve the problem through negotiations, and Tancred returned to Antioch. According to William of Tyre, Bernard, the Latin patriarch of Antioch, tried to reconcile the two sides and seemed for a while to have succeeded (49). Ibn al-Athir also mentions that the Patriarch, who was honored by his own people as Muslims honor an Imam, sought to make peace. On September 18, 1108, the patriarch decreed that the Frankish lords should withdraw in peace, Baldwin to Edessa and Tancred to Antioch.

Immediately on returning to Edessa, Baldwin, in an extraordinary demonstration of tolerance and gratitude toward Jawli, released 160 Muslim captives with their weapons (50).

Baldwin also intervened in the religious affairs of his new Muslim allies. When the Lord of Saruj recanted Islam and embraced Christianity, Jawli's followers beat him for his apostasy, stirring conflict between Muslims and Franks. On hearing of the matter, Baldwin had the man killed, saying that this apostate was of no worth to the Franks or the Muslims. Baldwin found another strong ally in Kogh Vasil (Basil), the Armenian lord of Kesum and Ra'ban (d. 1112). According to Matthew of Edessa, Baldwin was ransomed with the mediation and assistance of "the great Armenian Prince Kogh Vasil" (51). Having won over Kogh Vasil, Baldwin and Joscelin urged Jawli to join them in fighting Tancred, while ironically, Tancred sought the help of another Turk, Ridwan, Lord of Aleppo.

In September, 1108, the forces of Baldwin and Joscelin met those of Tancred and Ridwan near Manbij, on the road between Edessa and Aleppo. In the fierce battle that ensued, Tancred was victorious; Baldwin fled, taking refuge at the fortress of Ravendan, while Joscelin retreated to Tall Bashir (52). It is estimated that the Christian forces lost about two thousand men (53). When the citizens of Edessa learned of Baldwin's defeat, they were sad; thinking he had died, they assembled at St. John's Church to decide who should rule Edessa. Meanwhile, Baldwin and Joscelin unexpectedly arrived in Edessa and, learning of the assembly, took it as a sign of disloyalty. Matthew of Edessa says that Frankish leaders pillaged the city and inflicted severe punishment on its inhabitants, apparently because they believed every vicious accusation against the people and were all too willing to shed innocent blood (54).

Whatever friendship had existed between the Franks and the Armenians in Edessa now gave way to hatred and distrust. The Armenians saw the Franks as enemies even worse than the Muslim Turks, with whom the Franks were allied against their fellow Christians (55). It is no surprise that in their desperation, ten Armenian traitors (according to the Anonymous Edessan) contacted [261] Mawdud, Atabeg of Mosul, when he campaigned against Edessa in 1112, offering to deliver the city into his hands. Matthew of Edessa does not give the number of traitors, saying only that certain perfidious men came to Mawdud offering to hand over the city (56). Michael Rabo says that when some Armenians saw the Turks invading Edessa and reaching its walls, they plotted to help them enter one of the fortresses, believing that they would occupy the city in the absence of its leader (57). When news of this conspiracy reached Joscelin I, he hurried to join Baldwin in Edessa. He fought heroically against the Turks and drove them from the city, then turned against the conspirators and punished them severely (58). After Mawdud retreated from Edessa, says the Anonymous Edessan, the Franks sought the traitors and captured many people, guilty or innocent, then cut off their hands and noses, gouged out their eyes, and tortured



and killed many (59). Those of the Armenians who survived elicited the Turks' aid against the Franks. In 1113, as Baldwin of Le Bourg led his forces to Tall Bashir, which he had wrested from Joscelin I, "the bloodthirsty and savage amir Mawdud" again marched on Edessa (60). Some perfidious Franks maliciously reported to Baldwin that many Armenians planned to surrender the city to Mawdud. Baldwin believed them and dispatched Paynes, count of Saruj, with orders to expel all the townspeople of Edessa. He must have carried out this order, for the Franks put the helpless inhabitants to the sword. Matthew says the Franks committed these atrocities because of their perverse nature and their complete contempt for those they considered evil, repaying the goodness of the city's faithful Christians with evil and malice. Those who were evicted from Edessa went to live in Samosata. Baldwin, finding he could not rule an empty city with only a few Syrians and loyal Armenians, decided in February 1114 to recall the exiles from Samosata. They returned, but his relationship with the Armenians was forever strained. They regarded him as their persecutor and detested the Franks, who had ill-treated them (61).

To spite Baldwin, the Armenians sought to ally themselves to the Seljuk Turks. In 1114, the Turks, under Aqsunkur al-Bursuki, began a massive campaign against Edessa, besieging it for two months. On failing to capture the city, Aqsunkur lifted the siege and departed. It was then that the Armenian King Dgha Basil (Vasil), son of Kogh Vasil, sent a messenger to Aqsunkur proposing an alliance against the Franks (62). He had learned that Tancred sought to take over the principality of Kesum and Ra'ban, and saw in Aqsunkur al-Bursuki an ally who could thwart this conquest. Aqsunkur accepted Basil's proposal on the condition that he be allowed to impose the *jizya* (a tax imposed by Muslims on non-Muslim subjects, mainly Christians and Jews, in exchange for their protection), to signify that Kesum and Ra'ban had become his vassal principality (63). When Baldwin learned of the proposed alliance of [262] Dgha Basil and his father's widow with the Seljuk Turks, he was furious, calling their action a threat to Christianity and especially to the Latin principalities in Syria and lower Asia Minor. He invaded Kesum and Ra'ban in 1115, but had little success. Dgha Basil sought help from Thoros I, son of Constantine, the Roupenid ruler of Partzaper in Cilicia (1100-1129). But Matthew of Edessa reports that Thoros seized Dgha Basil and handed him over to Baldwin, who tortured him and forcibly seized all his territory. Betrayed and stripped of his possessions, Dgha Basil went to Constantinople, where the Byzantine emperor received him and his troops with great honor (64). The native Syrians fared no better than the Armenians. In 1117, Dawla, the lord of Melitene, seized their monasteries, capturing 7,400 monks and appropriating their possessions (65). He evicted others from the fortress of Arnish and put an army garrison in their place. He forced the monks to pay 2,000 dinars, tortured them mercilessly and then annihilated them, and turned their monasteries into villages. Thus, the Syrians suffered the same atrocities as the Armenians from the Franks, who aimed to vanquish them and capture their land (66).

Meanwhile, Baldwin continued his seizure of other Armenian enclaves. He pillaged the principality of the Armenian prince Bagrat, who resided in Ravendan, near Aleppo. He had Constantine, Armenian lord of Gargar, chained and thrown into prison in the citadel of Samosata, where he died. (Following a nighttime earthquake, Constantine's body was discovered on the bank of the Euphrates) (67). Having conquered the Armenian princes and seized their territories, Baldwin and his countrymen now felt more secure than ever. In 1118, he left Edessa to rule the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, declaring no one was more qualified to succeed him as the Lord of Edessa and defend the northeast front of the Latin domains than Joscelin I of Courtenay. Thus, Joscelin replaced Baldwin in Edessa, and the two Frankish leaders were finally reconciled (68).

Joscelin I tried to be more conciliatory toward the Armenians than Baldwin had been. Abandoning his former cruel nature, he adopted a very humane, compassionate attitude toward the inhabitants of Edessa (69). The Armenians came to his aid several times, and when he was taken captive by Nur al-Dawla Belek, the Urtukid ruler of Aleppo, in 1123, some twenty of them succeeded in releasing him from prison (70). The people of Edessa, both Syrians and Armenians, were more appreciative of Joscelin I than of Baldwin (71).

Joscelin I died in 1131 and was succeeded by his son Joscelin II, whom the Anonymous Edessan says was "a stupid youth and void of understanding" (72). William of Tyre finds nothing praiseworthy about him except his

military prowess (73). Joscelin's treatment of the Syrians was ignominious: his meddling in their church affairs aroused their antipathy. He had bad relations with Raymond of Poitiers, prince of Antioch (1136-1149) and with the Byzantines. [263] Only the Armenians fared well under his rule, perhaps because his mother was of Armenian stock. One Arab writer calls him "Joscelin the Armenian" (74). Worst of all, he showed little or no concern over the growing threat posed by a new power in the East, the Zangids. In 1128, Imad al-Din Zangi, Atabeg of Mosul, had begun taking control of Syria, systematically challenging the Franks; he captured Edessa in 1144, the jewel of their possessions, then under Joscelin's lordship (75).

**Continued on Next Page**

## Matti Moosa's

### *The Crusades: An Eastern Perspective with Emphasis on Syriac Sources\**

\* This material, which is presented solely for non-commercial educational/research purposes, was published in the journal *The Muslim World* Vol. 93 (April, 2003), pp. 249-289.

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#### Footnotes

The fall of Edessa into Turkish hands had a devastating impact on the Franks' power in Syria. The Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, ruled by Melisend, mother of the underage Baldwin III, was too far from the Franks' center of operations in Edessa, and the Latin principalities of Antioch and Tripoli were too weak to challenge the Turks in Syria. It is no exaggeration to say that the loss of Edessa to Zangi (and later his brother Nur al-Din) foreshadowed the fall of Jerusalem in 1187. It demonstrated the weakness of the Franks, rather than the unity of the Turks. Indeed, the Turks suffered from dissension, with the Seljuk amirs opposing one another and the Abbasid caliphs against all of them. Having lost power to the Seljuk Turks since the eleventh century, the Abbasid caliphs were intent on regaining their old dominance and territory in Syria (76).

The assassination of 'Imad al-Din Zangi as he was attacking the fortress of Ja'bar on September 14, 1146, was happy news for Joscelin, who sought at once to take advantage of the resulting chaos and recapture Edessa (77). He appealed to Baldwin, lord of Kesum and Mar'ash, and was promised aid. To Joscelin, recovering Edessa meant the reversal of the ascendancy the Muslims had recently gained. But he had underestimated the Turks' determination to protect their power after Zangi's death, and received no help from Raymond of Poitiers, who was displeased with both Joscelin and Baldwin (78). He called upon the inhabitants of Edessa, mostly Armenians, to rise up against the Muslims; they responded to his appeal, and although Joscelin attacked and occupied Edessa, he could not take its citadel, apparently because his forces had brought neither engines of war nor materials to build them (79). The Turks regrouped and retook the city by assault after five days, and the ensuing destruction of Edessa evoked lamentation from Michael Rabo and other Syrian writers, especially the Anonymous Edessan (80).

Edessa, the center of Christianity in Syria, lay in ruins. Its Christian inhabitants were the victims of the ambitious Franks and cruel Turks alike. The Franks were especially culpable because they had meddled in the Christians' church affairs, compounding their problems. Joscelin II, who should have rallied the Christians to repel the Turks, recapture Edessa, and reassert his authority, was too involved in pursuing pleasure to assume this responsibility. Instead, when his purse was empty, he found it expedient to move on the [264] wealthy Syrian Monastery of Mar Barsoum, plundering its possessions and its treasury (81). But the Franks, especially Joscelin II, continued to meddle in the affairs of the Syrian Church as they always had. We should note here that the Syrian Church had long been in turmoil created by recalcitrant and disobedient bishops, seeking either to obtain earthly gain or to usurp the patriarchate. This turmoil was due largely to the rigid legalism of patriarchs like Abu al-Faraj Athanasius VI of the Camra family, who insisted on observing the letter of church laws that

even at the start of the eleventh century seemed harsh and unbearable. Like the Greeks before them, the Franks became arbiters of the Syrians' problems (82).

Ironically, this Frankish prince, Joscelin, was rebuked by a Muslim Turk for violating Christian principles when he plundered the Monastery of Mar Barsoum. Dawla's father Ghazi, the Turkish governor of Melitene, had imposed heavy taxes on the monastery, but Dawla lavished gifts on it and exempted the monks from taxes to obtain their allegiance. When Joscelin sought peace, Dawla answered, "We, like you, seek peace. But tell me, how can you assert your desire for peace when you have proven that you have no faith? The Muslims swear by [the Qur'an], and Christians swear by the cross and the Gospel. But you yourself have violated the sanctity of the gospel and broken the cross into pieces. You have nothing to do with the Christian faith. Reveal your true faith, whether you are a Jew or a pagan, so that we may establish peace with you on the basis of your faith." Eventually, Joscelin was defeated and captured by the Turks. The monks returned to the monastery, and through God's providence, made their peace with the Turks (83).

Dawla was not the only Muslim ruler to show concern about the Monastery of Mar Barsoum. The Seljukid Sultan Kilij Arslan II of Rum (1155-1192) was even more kindly disposed toward Michael Rabo and the monastery. When he visited Melitene in July 1182, he summoned Michael Rabo to an audience, receiving the Syrian patriarch with great honor and offering him gifts, to the surprise of everyone. The Sultan also abolished the taxes imposed on the monastery, affirming this promise with a royal script (84).

The news of the fall of Edessa to the Muslim Turks had resounding repercussions in the West. When King Louis VII of France held court at Bourges, the bishop of Langres spoke about the devastation of Rohes (Edessa), the oppression of the Christians, and the arrogance of the heathens, rousing his listeners to join the King in his forthcoming fight to aid the Christians (85). The loss of Edessa, not only a major center of Christianity but also the first Latin principality in the East, foreshadowed the collapse of the structure that the Franks had established in the First Crusade, and thus set in motion the Second Crusade, which ended in utter failure (86). The nations of the West dispatched a combined German and Frankish force under Conrad II and Louis VII, but only [265] a small part of this expedition actually reached the east. This venture, however, inspired Baldwin III, king of Jerusalem, to make a bold move against the Muslims. In 1149, he sought to capture Damascus, but his attack on the city was more a raid than a real military campaign. Had he succeeded, all Syria and Mesopotamia would have been severed from Egypt, and Saladin's later effort to unite the Muslims of the north with those of the south, which dealt a fatal blow to the Franks in 1187, would have had no chance of success (87).

A detailed account of the Second Crusade is beyond the scope of this study, but the events of this period reveal much about relations between the Christian population and their rulers. The Byzantines considered the recovery of Edessa their own responsibility, not that of the Franks (88). According to Syriac sources, this view so enraged the Franks that they waged war against the Byzantines and destroyed their capital, Constantinople. Mas'ud, the Seljuk Sultan of Rum (1116-1155), took advantage of this conflict to unleash his troops against the Franks, slaughtering them and plundering their possessions. Most of the captured loot was sent to Persia; the Turks' territory was so full of booty that in Melitene, silver was as cheap as lead. Conrad III's army, fleeing annihilation by the Turks, suffered an inhumane disaster at the hands of the Greeks, who mixed lime with grain and sold it to the soldiers (89). The Second Crusade failed, and the Turks ravaged Antioch, another important center of Christianity in Syria. This crusade was undertaken to recover Edessa from the Turks, consolidate the power of the Latin principalities, and curtail the influence of Nur al-Din Zangi. But the Franks failed because of their internal dissension and disagreement with Byzantine Emperor Manuel I Comnenus (1134-1180), who wanted Louis VII and Conrad II to become his vassals and expected them to hand over to him every territory they might capture in Asia Minor (90).

The Franks' chief concern was to prevent Nur al-Din Zangi from capturing Aleppo, the principal city of Syria, but they were at a disadvantage due to a rift between Joscelin II and Raymond of Poitiers, lord of Antioch, who

had refused to support Joscelin when the Turks attacked Edessa. Nur al-Din welcomed the Frankish leaders' dispute and sent a delegation to Joscelin to conclude a treaty of friendship; later they met between Azaz and Aleppo and swore to uphold their new covenant, which Michael Rabo says ultimately led to the collapse of the Franks' power (91). Joscelin to all intents and purposes surrendered his authority to Nur al-Din and became his client. According to Ibn al-Qalanisi, having neutralized Joscelin as a threat, Nur al-Din attacked the province of Antioch in 1148, but retreated to Aleppo after Raymond assembled troops and defeated him at Yaghra (92). But according to other Muslim sources, the Franks were soundly beaten at Yaghra, and some of their leaders were killed. Nur al-Din sent the booty and captives to his brother Sayf al-Din, to the [266] Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, and to Mas'ud, the Sultan of Rum (93). Syriac sources assert that the Franks defeated Nur al-Din and his men at Yaghra with aid from Ali ibn Wafa, chief of the Assassins of Masyaf and an enemy of Nur al-Din (94).

After the battle at Yaghra, Nur al-Din assembled his troops and assaulted Harim with help from Mu'in al-Din Unur, the Urtukid ruler of Damascus (95). After destroying Harim and the surrounding villages, he laid siege to the fortress of Inab, near Aleppo on the edge of the Rugia valley. Raymond of Poitiers rushed to its defense with only 4,000 horsemen and 1,000 infantrymen, while Nur al-Din's force included 6,000 horsemen, augmented by many Turkoman followers (96). Rejecting the advice of Ali ibn Wafa to return to his own territory, Raymond plunged his troops into battle and was beaten on June 29, 1149; both he and Reginald, lord of Kesum and Mar'ash, were killed (97).

Nur al-Din next besieged Antioch again, and the city's inhabitants surrendered to him to escape destruction (98). Nur al-Din had become a real threat to the Franks, particularly since the deaths of Raymond and Reginald left only Joscelin II as a leader. But Joscelin, selfish and inclined to a life of ease and pleasure, was not the right man to challenge the Turks. He showed little concern over the death of his son-in-law Reginald, instead using the opportunity to add Kesum and Mar'ash to his domain. After several futile attempts to engage the Turks, Joscelin II fell into the hands of Nur al-Din, who had him chained and thrown into prison at Aleppo for five years. His odious character was partially redeemed by his refusal to recant his faith to save his life, despite being first showered with gifts and later threatened under torture. When his end drew near, he asked to be taken from his cell to the Syrian bishop of Aleppo, who heard his confession and administered the Holy Communion. After his death, the Turks handed his body to the Christians, who buried him in the church. A great many Christians and Muslims attended his funeral, bewildered by the events that had taken place (99). Ibn al-Athir gloats over Joscelin's capture, saying it was a tremendous victory because Joscelin was "a tyrant devil, cruel and too harsh on the Muslims; all of Christendom was afflicted by his capture" (100).

From his rise to power in 1146 until his death in 1174, Nur al-Din worked to found a Muslim state expanding from Mosul to take in all Syria, Egypt, and Yemen. Calling for *jihad*, he challenged the power of the Franks. He is rightly considered the precursor to Saladin, who defeated the Franks in 1187 and restored Jerusalem to Muslim control. Indeed, no Muslim ruler in the medieval period was more controversial than Nur al-Din Zangi. Ibn al-Athir lavishes praise on him, stating that since the time of *al-Khulafa' al-Rashidun* (the Rightly Guided Caliphs) in the seventh century, no Muslim sovereign except [267] the Umayyad Caliph 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-Aziz (reigned 717-720) could match him in demeanor, justice, and fairness. He lauds him for his indifference to worldly things and strict adherence to Islamic law, worship, and piety. He says Nur al-Din spent much time at prayer and followed the precepts of his faith rigorously, including the *jihad*, to which he felt he had been called to make Islam triumph. A Sunnite from the Hanafite school, he held no prejudice against Muslims with differing beliefs. He was abstemious in his diet, simple in his dress, and chaste in sexual matters. He glorified the *Shari'ah* (Islamic law), which guided his work and conduct (101). Yet Ibn al-Athir reveals another side of Nur al-Din's character, his use of trickery and deception, particularly in his relations with the Franks (102). William of Tyre calls him a just prince, valiant and wise and, according to the traditions of his race, a very religious man, but says he was a mighty persecutor of the Christians (103). The Anonymous Edessan also describes Nur al-Din as cunning, yet very strict in observing Islamic law; he praises him for his justice and for his abolition of various

taxes in the countries under his control (104). Yet his justice may have applied only to his Muslim subjects: Michael Rabo and the Anonymous Edessan state that the Christians suffered greatly from Nur al-Din's oppression and persecution. Nur al-Din attempted to win the allegiance of the Muslims in Mosul in 1171 by persecuting the Christians, ordering that their churches and monasteries be destroyed. He issued a similar order at Nisibin, and the Muslims there demolished the Church of St. Jacob, and Muslims in Mardin usurped the Church of the Forty Martyrs (105). Bands of Kurds near Mosul attacked the Monastery of Mar Matta (St. Matthew), pillaged it, and killed many of its monks. Facing resistance by the monks, the marauders rolled a huge rock down from the top of the mountain; it partly penetrated the monastery's outer wall and remains lodged there today (106). Bar Hebraeus says that the persecution of the Syrian community continued into his time, as Syrians were caught in a power struggle between the Turks and Kurds (107). Nur al-Din died in 1174 without having achieved his aim of defeating the Franks and capturing Jerusalem. Yet he was the first Muslim ruler to undertake what had seemed an impossible task: to unite the different Muslim ethnic factions to achieve these common goals. This awesome task was left to Saladin.

Syriac sources differ on Saladin's career. Michael Rabo and the Anonymous Edessan mark the beginning of his career as 1176, when he marched out of Egypt with a great army with the intention of controlling Syria, the domain of the late Nur al-Din (108). Bar Hebraeus mentions Saladin in reporting the events of the year 1151, saying that in that year, Saladin left his father, Najm al-Din Ayyub, the governor of Balbak (in present-day Lebanon) and went to Aleppo to join his uncle Asad al-Din Shirkuh. Shirkuh then brought him to Nur al-Din, who took him in and offered him sustenance (109). This is the first evidence that [268] Saladin received the favor and support of Nur al-Din, the powerful master of Syria, and thereby began his rise to power.

Saladin played a crucial role in the history of the Crusades. He achieved what earlier Muslim leaders, particularly Nur al-Din, could not: he drove the Franks from Jerusalem in 1187 and restored it to Muslim hands, achieving the ultimate triumph over the infidels. Jerusalem had been the spiritual target of the Franks' invasion of the East, in which an incredible amount of blood was shed. It is not surprising that Muslims saw Saladin as the supreme defender of their faith. The Qadi Baha' al-Din ibn Shaddad, who was in Saladin's service, describes him thus: "Our Lord Sultan al-Nasir (he who grants victory), who brought the faithful together and destroyed the worshippers of the Cross, the bearer of the banner of justice and charity, Salah al-Din wa al-Dunya (rectitude of faith and the world), the Sultan of Islam and Muslims, the rescuer of the Holy House of Allah (Jerusalem) from the hands of the polytheists (Christians), the servant of the two sanctuaries (Mecca and Jerusalem), Abu al-Muzaffar Yusuf ibn Ayyub ibn Shadhi" (110). No words since have so succinctly expressed Saladin's virtues. Baha' al-Din describes Saladin as just, brave, benevolent, patient, and generous, even to his enemies the Franks, a wonderful companion and a man of pleasant disposition. He renounced the pleasures of this world and was so abstemious that he left almost no personal possessions at his death. Baha' al-Din summarizes the life and conduct of Saladin by saying that Islam had had no one like him since the time of the Rightly Guided Caliphs (recall Ibn al-Athir's similar comment about Nur al-Din) (111). Saladin's personality and character appealed to Western writers, most of whom had high praise for this unique Muslim. Runciman says, "He was the most attractive of all the great figures of the Crusading era. But he had his faults" (112). After enumerating his excellent traits, Runciman relates a legend recorded by Vincent of Beauvais: when Saladin was on his deathbed, he told his standard-bearer to set a piece of his shroud on a lance and carry it to Damascus, to show that he had taken nothing from this life except a rag (113).

Among the Syriac sources, Bar Hebraeus offers the fullest description of Saladin's character. He says that Saladin was patient, mild-tempered, generous, of good character, humble, and forgiving of the shortcomings of his companions, and relates anecdotes to illustrate his equanimity in dealing with men of any station in life. Bar Hebraeus also praises Saladin's generosity and benevolence, stating that when he died, there was almost nothing in his treasury. (Ibn Shaddad says that when Saladin died, his treasury contained only seventy-four silver dirhams and one piece of Tyrean gold; he left no estate, orchard, farm, village, or other property (n.114). It is

said that when he became master of Damascus, Saladin ordered that all the money in the treasury be brought out and laid before him. He ordered one of his men, Ibn [269] al-Muqaddam, to divide the money among the nobles, the horsemen, and the slaves, giving each a handful. When he doled out only small amounts, Saladin rebuked him and told him, "Avarice befits the merchants, not kings. Therefore do not distribute them with one hand, but with both" (115). Bar Hebraeus also shows Saladin's tolerance towards non-Muslims. He says that when Saladin was encamped before Acre with a *Qadi* (religious judge) beside him, a Jew appealed for help under the *Shari'ah*. When asked, the Jew said that the Sultan (Saladin) was his adversary, and his servants had wronged him. A merchant from Damascus, he had come by sea from Alexandria with twenty loads of sugar. But when he arrived at the port, Saladin's servants robbed him and said that he was an infidel and his goods rightly belonged to the Sultan. Saladin asked the servants their side of the story, and when they said they had deposited the merchandise in the treasury, he told officials to give the Jew the price of the sugar (116).

Some modern Western historians praise Saladin but acknowledge his personal faults. W. B. Stevenson compares him to the kings of France and England who led the Third Crusade, declaring, "Christendom did not excel Islam in the type of heroes whom it nurtured" (117). No historian can overlook Saladin's qualities as a person and a military leader, but they are only one aspect of this remarkable man. He was a man of his time—ambitious, cunning, ruthless, and manipulative. But at the start of his career, he was not the virtuous person whom the historians portray. He drank wine and pursued pleasure, in contradiction of Islam. It was only in 1169, when he became the sole ruler of Egypt, that he experienced a religious metamorphosis and became the defender of Islam against the infidel Franks (118). He owed his rise to power to his master and benefactor Nur al-Din Zangi, whose wealth enabled him to further his ambitions.

Saladin was born in 1137 at Takrit, in present-day Iraq; his father, Najm al-Din, was the city's governor. Najm al-Din came with his brother Asad al-Din Shirkuh to Iraq and entered the service of Mujahid al-Din Bahruz ("the Eunuch"), the governor of Takrit, who made him an administrator (119). The brothers went to Takrit, but Asad al-Din soon became involved in a dispute that caused their expulsion from the city. Najm al-Din then took his son and his brother to Mosul, where Nur al-Din Zangi received them and helped them prosper. When Nur al-Din occupied Ba'albak, he named Najm al-Din governor of its citadel in Ayyub and gave Asad al-Din the cities of Hims and Rahubuth (120).

But it was Egypt that offered Saladin the opportunity to rise to power. Nur al-Din was determined to overthrow the Shiite Fatimids in Egypt and add that country to his domain. In 1164, he sent a military expedition to Egypt under Asad al-Din Shirkuh, who took along his nephew Saladin, then twenty-seven. [270] The Vizir of the Fatimids, Shawir, was the real power in Egypt at the time, holding authority even over the caliph. Hoping to repel the invaders, Shawir and the Egyptians allied themselves with the Franks; they defeated Shirkuh at Bilbays, forcing him to flee Egypt. In 1167, Shirkuh made another attempt to overthrow Shawir; again he failed and withdrew (121). But he returned in 1169; this time, accompanied by Saladin, defeating Shawir and his Frankish allies (122). Shirkuh thus won the favor of the Fatimid Caliph al-'Adid (1160-1171), who named him Vizir of Egypt, replacing Shawir, and gave him the titles of al-Mansur (The Victorious) and Commander of the Armies. Shirkuh soon became established in his position. He employed only those whom he trusted and divided the land among the troops who accompanied him to Egypt. But his rule lasted only two months; he died on March 23, 1169, of *khanuq* (angina) (123). The Anonymous Edessan says Shirkuh treated Egypt's Christians with cruelty, burdened them with taxes, and restricted their conduct. During Shirkuh's brief reign, over 14,000 Christians in Egypt embraced Islam, evidently to escape persecution (124).

Following Shirkuh's death, Saladin emerged as the most powerful man in Egypt. The Anonymous Edessan says that before his death, Shirkuh handed the governance of Egypt to his nephew (125). Saladin became the commander of the military forces in Egypt, and the Caliph al-'Adid, forced to acknowledge his power, conferred upon him the title of Vizir of Egypt (126). The Caliph apparently underestimated Saladin's ambitions, thinking

he was only supported by a small segment of the Syrian army. He plainly imagined that he could control Saladin, despite having given him the title of Vizir (127).

Saladin's position in Egypt was precarious, despite his new power; he lavished bribes and gifts on his troops to win their allegiance (128). He aspired to become the supreme ruler of Egypt, but had to contend with Nur al-Din Zangi, who was proclaimed in the Friday *khutba* as the ruler of Egypt, and whom he served as a deputy. The Egyptians took their orders not from Saladin but from Nur al-Din, who in his communications addressed him as *Asfah Salar Saladin* (Saladin, Commander of the Army). But Saladin gradually began to win people's hearts by giving them gifts and money collected by his uncle Shirkuh. Thus, a conflict arose between Nur al-Din Zangi and Saladin over control of Egypt, and ended only with Nur al-Din's death in 1174 (129).

The conflict between Nur al-Din and Saladin embodied the clash between Shi'ism and Sunnism in Egypt. Egypt was predominantly Shi'ite, while Nur al-Din was a Sunnite. In 1171, he ordered Saladin to stop proclaiming the Shi'ite Fatimid al-Adid caliph and instead proclaim the authority of the Abbasid Caliph al-Mustadi in Baghdad. Bar Hebraeus puts Nur al-Din's determination to eradicate Shi'ism in its proper perspective, asserting that he violently abhorred the Arabs (Shi'ite Muslims), who were descended from 'Ali (130). Saladin [271] feared that if he stopped proclaiming the name of al-'Adid in the Friday *khutba*, people would revolt against him. When Nur al-Din pressed him, Saladin sought the counsel of his men. He finally yielded and ordered preachers throughout Egypt to proclaim the name of the Abbasid Caliph. There was no massive revolt by the Shi'ites, and eventually Shi'ism faded in Egypt and gave way to Sunnite Islam. It is reported that when al-'Adid was on his deathbed, he sought but was denied an opportunity to see Saladin, and after the Caliph died, Saladin regretted this refusal (131).

Before al-'Adid's death, Saladin had already arranged to take possession of his wealth. He ordered his eunuch Baha' al-Din Qaraqush to oversee the Caliph's palace and safeguard his effects. He moved al-'Adid's immediate family to separate quarters and kept his other relatives under guard. He drove out the Caliph's slaves and bondmaids, setting some of them free, selling others, and offering the rest as gifts to his men. He kept some personal effects and treasures, but gave others as gifts or sold them off. Ibn al-Athir says that this treasure, which had been collected for generations, included jewels and precious objects which no other king had had, including a long emerald staff and 100,000 manuscripts (132). Bar Hebraeus tells us that Saladin carried out these actions maliciously with the intention of decimating the Fatimid line, and he succeeded (133). The Anonymous Edessan attributes the Caliph's death to Saladin, saying that he plotted to kill al-'Adid and did so, perhaps by poison; William of Tyre likewise accuses Saladin of murdering al-'Adid (134). In any case, Egypt was restored to Sunnite Islam for the first time since the tenth century, under the nominal authority of the Abbasid caliphs in Baghdad (135). The Anonymous Edessan says the Caliph rewarded Saladin with the title of *al-Sultan al-A'zam* (The Great Sultan) (136).

While Nur al-Din Zangi was alive, Saladin was subservient to him. After the Caliph's death, Saladin was tempted to act on his own, but feared incurring Nur al-Din's wrath and perhaps provoking him to invade Egypt and remove him from power. Armed conflict between the two appeared inevitable until Nur al-Din died from angina in 1174, leaving Saladin as the only Muslim leader of great consequence. Saladin's fortune was further enhanced by the death of Amalric I, King of Jerusalem, which led to great dissension among the Franks and weakened their ability to fight the Muslims.

The death of Nur al-Din Zangi created a power struggle. Although his son al-Malik al-Salih Isma'il was only eleven years old, all the nobles swore oaths of fealty to him (137). Saladin also proclaimed Malik the ruler and stamped his name on the currency (138). The judge Kamal al-Din Shahrzuri urged Shams al-Din ibn al-Muqaddam and other amirs who had been close to Nur al-Din to consult with Saladin on the guardianship of al-Malik al-Salih. Since Saladin was one of Nur al-Din's mamluks and his deputy, it was in their best interest not to ignore [272] him, lest he use such action as a pretext to rebel. But the amirs rejected this counsel, fearing that if



Saladin was named al-Malik al-Salih's guardian, he might oust them from power. The issue was finally resolved when Shams al-Din 'Ali ibn al-Daya seized Aleppo and Ibn al-Muqaddam became the guardian and tutor of al-Malik al-Salih in Damascus (139). But the amirs of Damascus did not trust al-Muqaddam, believing he had gained total control of al-Salih Isma'il and the affairs of Aleppo. They invited Nur al-Din's nephew Sayf al-Din, Lord of Mosul, to take care of al-Malik al-Salih and his domain; he refused, and the amirs reluctantly invited Saladin to take possession of Damascus (140). Saladin came there at the end of November 1174 and resided in his father's house, the al-Aqiqi residence (141). Yet, he had come not to save the kingdom of his master's son, but to become its indisputable lord. Michael Rabo says Saladin used Sayf al-Din's occupation of Harran and Edessa as a pretext to march on Damascus. He said publicly that he had come to rescue his master's son, his mother, and his legal guardians, but in fact al-Salih Isma'il, his mother, and the amirs of Aleppo did not trust him (142). Michael Rabo says Saladin tried to win the favor of the Syrian people by scattering the wealth he had brought from Egypt as he would scatter dust and even struck peace with the Franks. Sayf al-Din, lord of Mosul, sent his forces to expel Saladin from Damascus; Saladin tried to win them over with kind words, but they insulted him, calling him "a dog set to assail his master" (143). Bar Hebraeus says that Saladin occupied the citadel of Damascus and handed it over to his brother Sayf al-Islam and his men (144). The Anonymous Edessan says Saladin's claim that he came to Damascus to help the son of Nur al-Din and buttress his power was simply a pretense, for he constantly intervened in the affairs of state. In a few years, Saladin controlled the region extending from the mountain ranges of Lebanon to Aleppo. His capture of Damascus and his attack on Aleppo alarmed the Franks, who realized that unless they stopped him, Saladin would become a more formidable adversary than they ever imagined (145). After taking over Damascus, Saladin marched on Hims and Hama, taking them on December 10, 1174. By the end of the month, he reached Aleppo, but the people would not surrender. Aleppo was of critical importance to Saladin. It was the chief city in Syria, the seat of government for al-Malik al-Salih, and the center of Syrian political and administrative activity. Occupying it would mean that all the territory of Nur al-Din had fallen into his hands. William of Tyre rightly observes that Saladin took it for granted that Aleppo and its young lord would surrender to him with the help of certain traitors (146).

After a futile five-month siege, Saladin urged al-Malik al-Salih to surrender the city to him, saying he had come to Syria to help him reassert his rule and protect him against the Franks. But al-Malik al-Salih and his advisors appealed to the Franks and the Isma'ili *batinis* (Assassins) for help in warding off his [273] attack. The Isma'ilis made a scheme to kill Saladin, but it was exposed and foiled at the last moment (147). Al-Malik al-Salih's cousin Sayf al-Din, lord of Mosul, rushed to help him. To appease Sayf al-Din, Saladin proposed to relinquish control of Hims and Kama while keeping only Damascus, and to act there as his deputy (148). The Zangids rejected this idea and sneered at the envoy Saladin had sent to negotiate with them, making war inevitable. They met Saladin's forces at Qurun Hama at the end of April 1175, and were beaten (149). Saladin next marched on Aleppo and laid siege to it. Though he did not take the city, he stopped the proclamation of al-Malik al-Salih as ruler in the Friday *khutba* and removed his name from the coinage (150). Bar Hebraeus says that al-Malik al-Salih sent an envoy to seek peace, proposing that Saladin take Damascus while relinquishing Hims, Hama and the rest of Syria. When Saladin rejected these terms, he offered to cede al-Ma'arra and Kafratab. Saladin demanded Ba'rin as well, and peace was made. Saladin swore that the name of al-Malik al-Salih would be proclaimed in all the countries under his control, and whenever there was need, he would come to his aid. When the 'Abbasid caliph in Baghdad learned of Saladin's victory, he sent him gifts in honor of the occasion (151). Stanley Lane-Poole and other Western sources assert that the Caliph conferred upon Saladin such titles as King or Sultan of Egypt and Syria (152).

Despite his defeat, Sayf al-Din refused to give up his fight against Saladin, whom he believed had usurped the power and domain of al-Malik al-Salih. Inevitably, their forces engaged in battle at Tall al-Sultan on April 22, 1176, and Sayf al-Din was defeated (153). To cut the lines of communication between Aleppo and Mosul, Saladin occupied Buza'a and Manbij, northeast of Aleppo, in May 1176. He besieged Aleppo a second time but failed because of the staunch resistance of its people. Finally, he concluded peace with al-Malik al-Salih by

promising to return the captured city of Azaz (supposedly al-Malik al-Salih's sister asked for it as a gift for achieving peace with her brother) (154). Saladin used another artful stratagem to legitimize his control of the territory of Nur al-Din Zangi. Before he returned to Egypt at the end of 1176, he married Ismat al-Din Khatun, the widow of Nur al-Din and daughter of Mu'n al-Din Unur, the lord of Hims. 'Imad al-Din al-Isfahani says he did so to protect her honor, but the marriage appears to have been a political move (155). Interestingly, one writer credits Saladin's success to the death of Nur al-Din, noting that Saladin married his wife, put his heirs to flight, and seized the kingdom of Damascus, and says that Saladin's wife "raised up a rich man from a pauper, the lofty from the humble, a ruler from a slave " (156).

It should be noted that while Saladin besieged Azaz in June 1176, the *Batinis* made a second attempt on his life; he was struck in the head and wounded by a knife-wielding assassin (157). After making peace at Aleppo, [274] Saladin marched against Masyaf, the center of the Assassins' activity, killing and destroying at will. Masyaf was spared total destruction only by the intercession of Saladin's uncle, Shihab al-Din Mahmud al-Harimi (158).

Despite having made peace, Saladin still did not control Aleppo, and his situation was precarious. The Aleppines, encouraged by the Ismai'lis' attempt to kill him, appealed to Raymond III, the Frankish lord of Tripoli, for assistance. Raymond assented and marched against Hims, forcing Saladin to leave Aleppo (159). Ibn al-Athir also says the Aleppines asked Raymond to march, against some of the towns under Saladin's control, in order to lift the siege. Saladin learned of Raymond's move while he was in Hama and marched on Hims; Raymond withdrew to al-Rastan, south of Hama, allowing Saladin to seize Hims and bring all Syria under his control (160). To show his gratitude to the Franks, the governor of Aleppo released some Frankish captives imprisoned in the city's citadel since the time of Nur al-Din, including Reginald of Chatillon and Joscelin II of Courtenay (161). Michael Rabo says the Franks sent Reginald to challenge Saladin, who therefore returned Azaz to al-Malik al-Salih and made peace with him (162). This account differs from that of William of Tyre, who says King Baldwin IV ("the Leper") and Raymond III attacked al-Biq'a in Coele Syria, but does not state that the lords of Aleppo were involved with the Franks (163).

Ibn al-Athir's statement that the capture of Hims brought all of al-Sham (Syria) under Saladin's control is not quite correct (164). Aleppo, the city Saladin most coveted, was still controlled by the Zangids, along with Jazira and Mosul. But there was strife between two Zangid brothers, Izz al-Din Masud I, Lord of Mosul (1180-1193), and Imad al-Din Zangi II, Lord of Aleppo (1182-1183). Saladin was aware of this conflict and knew they had sought the Franks' assistance against him (165). He hoped to take advantage of their dispute to capture Aleppo. He attacked the city for three days but then shifted strategy, thinking that if he took Mosul first, Aleppo would easily fall into his hands. He subdued Edessa, Harran, al-Raqqa, Saruj, and Nisibin in September and October of 1182, and started his siege of Mosul at the beginning of December (166). Ibn Shaddad, who was then in Mosul, says Saladin arrived in the area on November 10 and sent envoys to Baghdad to seek aid from Caliph al-Nasir al-Din Allah (167). He reminded the Caliph of the Zangids' conflict and said they had betrayed Islam by making peace with the Franks (168). The Caliph sent an envoy, the Shaykh Sadr al-Din, to Saladin. When Saladin saw that Mosul was too well fortified to be taken by storm, he proposed peace to 'Izz al-Din, on the condition that he allow Saladin to take Aleppo without interference, but this proposal was rejected. Saladin then lifted the siege of Mosul and marched against Sinjar, which he easily captured (169).

After leaving Mosul, Saladin captured Amid and then Aintab, but Aleppo remained his objective. In May, 1183, he marched on Aleppo, where he [275] engaged in daily skirmishes with the forces of 'Imad al-Din, who was now weaker than ever and could not stand a protracted war with Saladin (170). Without consulting his chief allies, 'Imad al-Din reached a secret agreement whereby Saladin would take control of Aleppo, and he himself would receive Sinjar, Nisibin, al-Khabur, al-Raqqa, and Saruj (171). Thus, Saladin fulfilled his ambition to become master of Aleppo and turned his attention again to Mosul. After surviving military assaults in April, 1185 and March, 1186, 'Izz al-Din, tired of fighting Saladin, finally made peace with him on May 3, 1186, and agreed to become his vassal (172). The next month he returned to Aleppo, and at the end of June, entered

Damascus (173). After the men of Mosul had been won over to Saladin's side, they joined in his *jihad* against the Franks.

Saladin's battles with the Franks extended from 1176 to 1187. Taking advantage of his absence from Egypt in 1176, the Byzantines, in collaboration with the Franks, sent their fleet to invade the country. But Philip, Count of Flanders, who had just arrived from Europe, refused to take part in the invasion, and the plan collapsed; after reaching Acre, the Byzantine fleet returned to Constantinople, with its leaders disheartened (174). But Philip was willing to fight the Muslims in Syria. Joined by the forces of Bohemond III, prince of Antioch, Gerard Jober, master of the Hospitallers, and a number of Knights Templar, the Franks attacked Hama and besieged Harim, from December, 1176 to April, 1177 (175). The Franks, who had previously sworn to help Gumushtegin, the governor of Harim, instead committed atrocities and pillaged the surrounding region, but they were finally induced by intimidation and bribery to leave Harim (176).

Syriac sources make clear that Saladin's aim was to challenge the Franks in the Holy Land and capture the supreme prize, Jerusalem. So, says Michael Rabo, in 1178 he left Egypt with a great army and entered "the country of Jerusalem" (i.e., Palestine, not the city), attacking it with blind zeal. Saladin killed the first Frank he met and splashed his garments with his blood, as an act of purification (177). Saladin left Egypt with lightly armed troops and, passing the fortresses of Daron and Gazza, suddenly appeared before Ascalon. His troops laid waste to the land far and wide, burning nearby cities and districts as they roamed freely; Saladin gathered the captives and had them beheaded. Baldwin IV raised an army to fight him, accompanied by the Templars and Reginald of Chatillon (178). The Franks fell upon the Muslims as they were crossing a river near Tall al-Safiya and defeated them, but Saladin vowed to return and conquer them (179). Boosted by the victory, the Franks attacked Hama and Shayzar in the summer of 1178, killing, plundering, and taking captives. Intent on strengthening their position and guarding against future Muslim attacks, they began to build a city on the banks of the Jordan at Jacob's Ford, known in Islamic sources as Hisn Bayt al-Ahzan (The Fortress of Sorrows) or [276] Makhadat Bayt al-Ahzan (The Ford of the House of Sorrows) (180). On June 10, 1179, they engaged Saladin in battle at Tall al-Qadi, on the plain of Marj 'Uyun. They were badly defeated, and many of their leaders were captured; King Baldwin IV barely escaped with his life (181). Among the captives was Eudes (Odo) of St. Amand, whom William of Tyre blames for the Franks' defeat. They were further frustrated when Saladin stormed the castle of Bayt al-Ahzan and occupied it on August 30, 1179 (182). Confident of his strength, Saladin began attacking the Franks even more violently. On October 13, 1179, the Egyptian fleet attacked Acre, which Saladin's secretary al-Qadl al-Fadil called "the Constantinople of the Franks" (183). Saladin's army ravaged the areas of Sidon, Beirut, and Tyre, and, in April 1180, Izz al-Din, the governor of Ba'albak, attacked the district of Safad (184). The Franks found shelter only behind the walls of their towns and castles, and Baldwin IV was forced to sue for peace in the spring of 1180 (185).

By 1183, Saladin was in an ideal position to attack the Franks again. He controlled Damascus, Aleppo, and Egypt, with their enormous wealth. He had the solid support of the 'Abbasid caliph in Baghdad; Kilij Arslan II, the Seljuk Sultan of Rum, courted his favor, and he was at peace with the Byzantine emperor. In short, he faced no external danger except from the Franks. The Kingdom of Jerusalem was rent by political struggles between the court and the barons. Baldwin IV, suffering from leprosy, could no longer govern. He convened a council and appointed his sister's husband, Guy of Lusignan, as regent. He kept Jerusalem and the title of king, while Guy became chief administrator of the rest of the realm. But in November, 1183, Baldwin removed Guy from his position and from the line of succession to the throne, and had his five-year-old son crowned as Baldwin V. Early in 1184, Baldwin IV named Raymond III of Tripoli as his son's guardian (186). The situation was complicated by the deaths of Baldwin IV in March, 1185 and Baldwin V in August, 1186, which precipitated the inevitable conflict between Raymond and Joscelin III of Courtenay, the Count of Edessa. Joscelin tricked Raymond into going to Tiberias, ostensibly to invite the dignitaries of the kingdom to meet far from Jerusalem and determine the succession to the throne. But in his absence, Heraclius, the Latin patriarch of Jerusalem,

acting behind closed doors, crowned Guy of Lusignan as King of Jerusalem. Many Frankish barons opposed Guy, however, and the struggle over succession created a rancorous rift among the Franks' leaders, weakening them and making them easy prey for Saladin (187).

Saladin had vowed to spend the rest of his life fighting the enemies of God, i.e., the Christian Franks. In 1185, when he fell ill at Zemmar while on his way to attack Mosul, he said that if God healed him, he would destroy the enemies of Islam. Plainly, he was prepared to march on Jerusalem to recapture [277] and purify the Aqsa mosque, Islam's most revered site after Mecca and Medina. His secretary al-Qadi al-Fadil wrote, "The swords of *jihad* are rattling in their scabbards, the horses of Allah are calling the men to mount and be ready to march. The Aqsa Mosque expresses its patience, having been so long deprived of the Qur'an, and waits to be purified from the abomination of the crosses which have controlled it " (188).

In the summer of 1187, both sides moved their forces to Palestine. The Franks camped at the fountain of Saffuriyya, a mile from Nazareth, to assure themselves of an abundant water supply (189). After resting at Ashtara, Saladin crossed the Jordan to Khisfin, stayed at al-Uqhuwana for five days, then moved closer to the lake, camping at Sennabra. Finally, he moved to Kafr Sabt, where he had plenty of water and easy access to Lake Tiberias (190). There he also had the advantage of controlling the road from Saffuriyya to Tiberias, and thus could threaten the Franks at both locations (191). His forces were estimated at 20,000 men, including regulars and auxiliaries; the Franks may have had a similar number. One Latin source says the Franks had assembled twelve hundred knights, several hundred mounted bowmen armed in the Muslim fashion, and 18,000 footmen (192). Raymond III, who had hoped to succeed to the throne of Jerusalem, cast his lot with Saladin. When the Franks saw the determined appearance of the Muslim troops, their patriarch and a number of priests, monks, and knights came to criticize Raymond. They accused him of having converted to Islam and said he must have forgotten that the Muslims had massacred many Christians and captured others. The Patriarch threatened him with excommunication and the annulment of his marriage. Seeing that the Franks were serious in their condemnation, Raymond repented and accompanied the delegation to meet with Guy of Lusignan, and peace was restored between them (193). (No Muslim source states explicitly that Raymond converted to Islam. It is doubtful that he even considered doing so, for there was nothing to gain, and there is no evidence that he participated in or facilitated any military action against his own people.) Nevertheless, he had "committed an act of treason at the most unpropitious moment possible" (194). Meanwhile, Saladin sat still. He was eager to see the Franks leave Saffuriyya to fight him. He had set a trap, and the Franks soon fell into it (195).

The King held a council at Saffuriyya and asked Raymond for advice, since Tiberias was his city and his family was shut up in its citadel. Raymond suggested that the Franks let Tiberias fall if he could not persuade the Muslims to fall back. He knew that his wife and children and the small garrison in the citadel could not resist. Their only chance for survival was to embark in boats on the lake and hope the Franks could rescue them. He warned that between the Franks' camp and Tiberias, there was no water, except the little spring of [278] Cresson, and if they went to the rescue of the city, the Muslims would harass them and detain them between Saffuriyya, and Tiberias. Most important, the enemy would deprive them of food and water, and so would eventually defeat them. Raymond argued that the Franks should encamp in front of Acre, near their strongholds (196). But Gerard, the leader of the Knights Templar, urged the King to leave Saffuriyya and attack Saladin at Tiberias. The King accepted this idea; for he both feared and liked Gerard, who had helped to make him king and had given him the treasure of the king of England (197).

Leaving Saffuriyya was a fatal blunder. After moving barely ten miles, the Franks were harassed on every side by Muslim troops. Thirsty and fatigued, they could advance no more. The King and Raymond chose to spend the night of Friday, July 3, on a plateau, far from the enemy (198). For them it was a frightful night, for no man or beast had water. Some sources report that Saladin told his men to pour water on the ground within sight of the Christians, to spite them (199). While the Franks spent the night in agony and despair, the Muslims, confident of victory, shouted, "Allah Akbar!" (God is the Greatest!) (200). Some Franks dashed to reach the water but were

annihilated by the Muslims. To intensify the Franks' agony, the Muslims set fire to the brush covering the plateau, and the wind blew the smoke into the Frankish camp. All night long the two armies faced each other, neither sleeping nor fighting (201). At daybreak on Saturday, the Franks had to choose whether to die of thirst or throw what little strength they had into battle. According to Arab sources, when the Franks attacked in an effort to reach Lake Tiberias, Saladin blocked them and went around arousing his men. The Muslims hunted the Christians down with their lances and killed many, but some of the Franks chose to surrender rather than meet death (202). Bar Hebraeus says that when the Franks realized in the night of July 3 that they had no source of water, they were all the more stirred for battle. By daybreak, when the Muslims saw the Franks bustling about and not retreating, they were struck with fear, and Saladin went around offering "honey and gall—that is to say, words of encouragement and threats" (203). Weary and thirsty, the Franks found their will waning. The Templars and the Hospitallers in the rear sent word that they could no longer march or fight. On Saturday, July 4, 1187, the Franks lost the battle of Hittin to Saladin. Only a few escaped, among them Raymond of Tripoli, who may have had no other option on that dark day (204).

The Franks' loss may be attributed partly to their leaving Saffuriyya or to their thirst, but the chief reason was their internal strife. The Anonymous Ecclesian observes that the Franks were defeated "because of their bad behavior," meaning that they suffered from dissension (203). Michael Rabo says that the Franks lost because God had deserted them (206). King Guy was captured, along with Reginald of Chatillon, whom Ibn al-Athir called "a devil [279] and demon of the Franks, and the greatest enemy of the Muslims" (207). Saladin spared Guy of Lusignan, saying that kings do not kill kings, but he had vowed to kill Reginald because he had plundered Muslim caravans and blasphemed against Muhammad. To do so, he had to (and did) circumvent the Muslim code of honor and chivalry. A Latin source says that after Reginald was beheaded, Saladin "took some of his blood and sprinkled it on his own head to symbolize that he had taken vengeance" (208). Michael Rabo writes, "Saladin had the elder Arnat (Reginald) and three hundred [Templars and Hospitallers] killed, and washed himself with their blood" (209).

After Hittin, Saladin's forces went through Caesarea, Jaffa, Samaria, and Nazareth, killing, looting, and taking captives. On September 20, 1187, Saladin laid siege against Jerusalem; on October 2, Balian of Ibelin, at the urging of Patriarch Heraclius, accepted his terms of surrender (210). After long negotiations, Saladin agreed that the city's inhabitants could leave after paying a specified sum. Those who could pay were released; the rest remained captive. Michael Rabo says Saladin freed 20,000 men and women, including 4,000 old people; he kept 5,000 men to serve his forces and sent 50,000 to Egypt to build city walls. He left another 5,000 men in Jerusalem to rebuild the city walls, the Temple of Solomon, and the Aqsa Mosque, which the Muslims sanctified in accordance with their religious laws. They forbade Christians from entering the mosque and closed down the Church of the Resurrection and other churches (211). One Latin source calls Saladin's treatment of the men and women of Jerusalem magnanimous and says that he let them leave the city with impunity (212). But the Anonymous Edessan, a trustworthy eyewitness to the events in Jerusalem when Saladin occupied the city, gives a very different account:

I, the wretched and unfortunate, was then in Jerusalem, I saw with my own eyes the havoc, abominations, and ignominious acts of the Muslims which my tongue cannot describe or express. The Muslims sold the church vessels in the city's markets. They converted the churches and temples to stables, theaters of entertainment and brothels. They savagely perpetrated reprehensible actions against the monks and chaste nuns and other women. They took young men and women as captives and sold them in faroff countries. They denuded the churches not only of their ornaments, but also of wood and iron objects, and ripped off the doors and marble tiles that covered the walls and floors. They removed all these to faraway countries. However, they mercifully spared the Church of the Resurrection. They set up guards in it, not out of respect for its sanctity, but because of their greedy desire to lay hands on the gifts the people brought upon visiting it. The Muslims imposed a ten-

dinar entrance fee on every Christian who entered or worshipped at the Sepulcher of the Savior (213).

[280] The defeat of the Franks at Hittin was the end of the kingdom of Jerusalem, but the Muslims' battles with the Franks were not over. Saladin attacked the port of Tyre, but met with firm resistance led by Conrad of Monteferrat, who had just come to the East to make the pilgrimage to Jerusalem. After failing to take the city, Saladin departed to attack Beirut, Sidon, and Jubayl, and took control of other parts of Syria (including Lebanon) (214). He laid siege to Acre from August, 1189 to July, 1191, but failed to capture the city due to the sheer number of Frankish defenders. Michael Rabo says that at this time the German King Frederick Barbarossa went to help the Christians of the East. He marched through the Byzantine country and occupied Iconium, but drowned after reaching Cilicia (215). He adds that the forces of two kings, Richard (the Lion-Hearted) and Philip II (Augustus), attacked Acre and took it by storm in a ferocious battle early in July 1191. The Muslims gave up hope of capturing the city and proceeded to annihilate its Christian inhabitants. The Franks had intended to hand over to Saladin the Muslims still in the city, supposedly in exchange for the Franks still held by the Muslims in Damascus, but instead their king ordered all the Muslim captives killed at the gate of Acre. The Anonymous Edessan says 20,000 men were killed on that day; the bodies were piled up and burned at the gate (216).

The loss of Acre hurt Saladin. Enraged, he demolished the city of Jaffa and the walls of Ascalon to prevent the Franks from occupying them. Savoring their decisive victory, the Franks occupied Caesarea and rebuilt both cities, then made Henri of Champagne the governor of Acre and withdrew to their own territory, while Saladin rebuilt the walls of Jerusalem, stronger than before (217). Saladin still hoped to drive the Franks from the Holy Land, for they seemed intent on recapturing Jerusalem. They were strong enough to seize Darum and attack Muslim caravans en route to Palestine and were anxious to advance on Jerusalem too, but King Richard of England dissuaded them, saying that the Muslims had destroyed all the water sources near the city (218). Still fearing that the Franks might attack Egypt, Saladin reached a peace agreement in 1192 (219). Under its terms, the Franks were to keep Joppa and its suburbs, Caesarea, Arsuf, Haifa, Akka, Antioch, and Tripoli. Saladin also provided enough gold to rebuild the walls of Ascalon and agreed to open the road to Jerusalem for those Franks wishing to perform the pilgrimage. He then went to Beirut to meet with Bohemond III. Saladin received him warmly and offered him gifts, including half the revenue of the province of Antioch. From there, he went to Damascus and was received with great joy; so, Ibn al-Athir says, "The enemy departed the land of Islam" (220).

The year 1193, when Saladin died in Damascus, marks the real end of the struggle between the Franks and the Muslims over possession of Jerusalem (221). From then on, the Franks struggled to keep what possessions they had, but [281] their power waned. Jerusalem, the jewel of the Latin kingdom, was lost. Frederick II, who began a Crusade in 1227, gained control of Jerusalem in 1229 in a treaty with al-Malik al-Kamil (222). But in 1244, the city was restored to Islam by a contingent of Khwarizm Turks fleeing Chingiz Khan, at the invitation of al-Malik al-Salih Najm al-Din Ayyub (223). Michael Rabo and the Anonymous Edessan end their chronicles shortly after the death of Saladin. Bar Hebraeus takes his chronicle further, but mentions only a few events relating to the Crusades. He describes the battle of al-Mansura, where the Franks were defeated and King Louis IX, whom he calls "Ridafrance" (i.e., "Roi de France"), was taken prisoner along with his nobles (224). By the middle of the thirteenth century, the Crusades had lost their appeal. Although the Franks held power over towns and fortresses in Syria for a century after the death of Saladin, the Muslims were gaining the upper hand. The Mamluks of Egypt dealt the death blow to the Franks' power in the East, destroying their fortresses one by one. With the destruction of the Templar castle of Athlit (Castrum Peregrinorum) in August, 1291, the dramatic saga of the Crusades in Syria ended (225).

# Footnotes

## *The Crusades: An Eastern Perspective with Emphasis on Syriac Sources*

by Matti Moosa

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1. William of Tyre, *A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea*, translated and annotated by Emily Atwater Babcock and A. C. Krey (New York, 1943).
2. First published by Edward Pococke (Oxford, 1663), it was edited by Rev. Anton Salhani (Beirut, 1890), reprinted in 1958. Those responsible for the reprint apparently tampered with the text by deleting the account of the Arabs' burning of the Library of Alexandria.
- 3- Ishaq Armala, *al-Hurub al-Salibiyya fi al-Athar al-Suryaniyya* (Beirut, 1929).
4. On the biography and writings of Michael Rabo, see Aphram Barsoum, *Kitab al-Lulu al-Manthur fi Tarikh al-Ulum wa al-Adab al-Suryaniyya*, 2nd ed. (Aleppo, 1956), 489-493. This work, published in Hims (1943), was translated by Matti Moosa under the title *The History of Syriac Literature and Sciences* (Pueblo, Colorado, 2000). Chabot's use of the term *Syrien* is an interpolation; the manuscript is titled *Kibobo d'Makthabanuth Zabne d'Seem I'Mor Mikha'il Rabo Phatriarcho* [*The Book of the Chronicle Written by Mar Mikha'il the Great, the Patriarch*]. See the Arabic translation by Bishop Gregorius Saliba Shamoun, with an introduction by Gregorius Yuhanna Ibrahim, Metropolitan of Aleppo, under the title *Tarikh Mar Mikhail al-Suryani al-Kabir* (Aleppo, 1996),
5. Michael Rabo, *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, 3 (Paris, 1905), 544-545, 627, 631-633, 651-653. Unless otherwise noted, all references here are to the Syriac text.
6. Michael Rabo, 603.
7. Ara Edmond Dostourian, trans., *Armenia and the Crusades: The Chronicle of Matthew of Edessa* (Lanham, New York; London, 1993), cited hereafter as Matthew of Edessa.
8. Steven Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, 2 (New York, 1965), 484.
9. Michael Rabo, 640.
10. Barsoum, 500.

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11. See J. B. Chabot, ed., *Anonymi Auctoris Chronicon ad Annum Christi Pertinens*, in *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium*, 15 (Louvain, 1916), 5, and Barsoum, 500-501. The section on the Crusades, translated by A. S. Tritton and annotated by H. A. R. Gibb, was published as "The First and Second Crusades from an Anonymous Syrian Chronicle," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1 (1933), 69-101, and 2:273-305. Rev. Albert Abouna offers an Arabic translation, enriched with copious and useful footnotes, in *Tarikh al-Ruhawi al-Majhul*, vol. 2 (Baghdad, 1986). Suhayl Zakkar presents a partial Arabic translation in *al-Hurub al-Salibiyya*, 2 (Damascus, 1984), 453-531, but does not identify the text from which the translation was made; it is not clear that he knew Syriac.
12. Trans. E. A. Wallis Budge and published in two volumes (Oxford, 1932). Volume I contains the English translation and volume II the Syriac text, based on the Syriac MS in the Bodleian Library, Huntington no. 52, cited throughout here. In a prefatory note, Budge says he made his translation from another manuscript, written in Nestorian script and edited by Rev. Paul Bedjan. Thus, his references to the Syriac text (in parentheses in the English translation) may not coincide with the Bodleian manuscript.
13. Michael Rabo, 572-4.
14. Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, 72. Unless otherwise noted, all references here are to the Syriac text.
15. Matthew of Edessa, 86-8.
16. Bar Hebraeus, 75.
17. Michael Rabo, 575, 577-79.
18. Michael Rabo, 571, 585-86, 598.
19. Michael Rabo, 559-60.
20. For a thorough analysis of this subject see Matti Moosa, *The Maronites in History* (Syracuse, 1986), 95-102.
21. The Anonymous Edessan, 311-14. Bar Hebraeus, *Ecclesiastical History*, trans. into Latin and published in two facing columns (Syriac and Latin) by Jean Baptiste Abbeloos and Thomas Josephus Lamy as *Gregorii Barhebraei Chronicon Ecclesiasticum* (Louvain, 1872). I possess a unique Arabic translation of the second part of this work, made by Patriarch Aphram Barsoum when he was a monk at the Zafaran Monastery, handwritten and unpaginated, dated 1909. References to the *Ecclesiastical History* will refer to this manuscript, which describes the debate in the biography of Michael Rabo.
22. See A. A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire*, 1 (Madison, 1964), 355.
23. Rene Grousset, *L'Empire du Levant: histoire de la question d'Orient* (Paris, 1949), 119.
24. Michael Rabo, 586.
25. Bar Hebraeus, 82.
26. Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh*, in *Receuil des Historiens des Crusades*, 1 (Paris, 1872), 189-190.
27. The Anonymous Edessan, 55-6.
28. Michael Rabo, 587.



29. Kamal al-Din ibn al-Adim, *Bughyat al-Talab fi Tarikh Halab*, ed. Suhayl Zakkar (Beirut, 1972), 125-6.
30. Michael Rabo, 587.
31. The Anonymous Edessan, 49; Matthew of Edessa, 293, n. 3. Michael Rabo, 587, also says the Franks seized Antioch through the treachery of two Armenian brothers. Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh*, 1:192, says a person called Baruziyeh conspired with the Franks and led them into the city; Bar Hebraeus identifies him as Ruzbah, a Persian, perhaps the same as Pirus (Firuz) mentioned in Latin sources.
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32. See *Gesta Francorum et Aliorum Hierosolimitanorum*, trans. Rosalind Hill as *The Deeds of the Franks and Other Pilgrims to Jerusalem* (New York, 1962), 44-8, with Arabic translation by Hasan Habashi, *A'mal al-Firnajwas Hujjaj Bayt al-Maqdis* (Cairo, 1970), 66-70; Fulcher of Chartres, *Fulcheri Carnotensi Historia Hierosolymitana*, partly trans. Martha Evelyn McGinty as *Chronicle of the First Crusade* (London, 1941), 66-7; Frances Rita Ryan, trans., *A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem, 1095-1127* (Knoxville, 1969), 98, n. 1, lists other sources of information on Firuz.
33. Michael Rabo, 587; Bar Hebraeus, 82; the Anonymous Edessan, 59; Matthew of Edessa, 171; Runciman, "The Holy Lance Found at Antioch," *Analecta Bollandiana* (Brussels, 1950), 197-209. A number of Latin and Arabic sources also mention and elaborate on the discovery of the lance.
34. Michael Rabo, 589-690, 606-607.
35. On the dispute between the Latin patriarchs of Jerusalem and Antioch, see Reinhold Röhrich, *Geschichte des Konigsreiche Jerusalem 1100-1291* (Innsbruck, 1898), 184.
36. Sir Hamilton A. R. Gibb, "The Caliphate and the Arab States," in Marshall W. Baldwin, ed., *A History of the Crusades* (Madison, 1969), 1:94-98.
37. Michael Rabo, 587.
38. Usama ibn Munqidh, *Kitdb al-I'tibar*, trans. Philip Hitti under the title *An Arab Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period of the Crusades: Memoirs of Usamah Ibn Munqidh* (New York, 1929), introduction, 5.
39. Bar Hebraeus, 82.
40. The Anonymous Edessan, 60-61.
41. Michael Rabo, 606-07; William of Tyre, 1:458-459.
42. Albert of Aix, 4:352; Fulcher of Chartres, 40; William of Tyre, 1:191; Matthew of Edessa, 168; Runciman, 2:204-205, and "The First Crusades: Constantinople to Antioch," in Baldwin, ed., *A History*, 1:303; Grousset, *Histoire des Croisades*, 1:55; Chalandon, *Histoire de la Premiere Croisade*, 175; J. B. Segal, *Edessa the Blessed City* (Oxford, 1970), 229.
43. Grousset, *L'Empire du Levant*, 298.
44. Michael Rabo, 593; the Anonymous Edessan, 70; Matthew of Edessa, 197.

45. Abu Ya'la Hamza Ibn al-Qalanisi, *Dhayl Tdrikh Dimashq*, ed. H. Amedroz (Beirut, 1908), 148, trans. by H. A. R. Gibb as *The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades* (London, 1932), 69; Kamal al-Din Ibn al-Adim, *Zubdat al-Halab*, 2:150.
46. Matthew of Edessa, 197-198; W. B. Stevenson, *The Crusaders in the East* (Cambridge, 1907), 83, accepts this evidence.
47. Bar Hebraeus, 85; Michael Rabo, 592; the Anonymous Edessan, 71-72.
48. Ibn al-Athir, 1:262-263; Bar Hebraeus, 85, gives the same account.
49. William of Tyre, 2:34-35.
50. Ibn al-Athir, 1:262-263; Runciman, 2:112. Bar Hebraeus, 85, says it was Tancred who sent Jawli 100 Muslim prisoners, men and women, from the country of Aleppo.
51. Ibn al-Athir, 1:262-263; Matthew of Edessa, 192.
52. Matthew of Edessa, 201; Albert of Aix, 4:649; Runciman, 2:112-114.
53. Ibn al-Adim, *Zubdat al-Halab*, 2:153.
54. Matthew of Edessa, 201-202.
55. R. Grousset, *Histoire des Croisades*, 1:443.
56. The Anonymous Edessan, 75-79- Matthew of Edessa, 209-211.
57. Michael Rabo, 594-95; Grousset, 1:473.
58. Matthew of Edessa, 209-211.
- 59- The Anonymous Edessan, 75-79.

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60. Matthew of Edessa, 212.
61. Matthew of Edessa, 213; Grousset, *Histoire des Croisades*, 1:491, and *L'Empire du Levant*, 299; Zoe Oldenburg, *The Crusades*, 262.
62. Michael Rabo, 595.
63. Ibn al-Athir, 1:29.
64. Matthew of Edessa, 219-220.
65. The Anonymous Edessan, 150.
66. Michael Rabo, 595; Bar Hebraeus, 86-87.

67. Michael Rabo, 595; Bar Hebraeus, 86; Matthew of Edessa, 219-220.
68. The Anonymous Edessan, 80, 83; Matthew of Edessa, 225. See Fink, "The Foundation of the Latin States," 1:405, and Said 'Abd al-Fattah 'Ashur, *al-Haraka al-Salibiyya*, 1 (Cairo, 1963), 474.
69. Matthew of Edessa, 225.
70. Michael Rabo, 600; the Anonymous Edessan, 90-92; Matthew of Edessa, 229-230.
71. R. Grousset, *L'Empire du Levant*, 300.
72. The Anonymous Edessan, 103; Michael Rabo, 613.
73. William of Tyre, 2:51-53; Runciman, 2:193, follows William of Tyre.
74. Ibn al-Adim, *Bughyat al-Talab fi Tarikh Halab*, 1:321.
75. On 'Imad al-Din's capture of Edessa, see Michael Rabo, 638; the Anonymous Edessan, 118-136; Bar Hebraeus, 94-95; Gregory the Priest, *The Continuation of Matthew of Edessa*, in Matthew of Edessa, 243-244; Saint Nerses Schnorhali, *Elegie sur la prise d'Edesse*, in *R.H.C. Or.*, Documents Armeniens, ed. E. Dulaurier, 1 (Paris, 1869), 226-268, also translated into Arabic in 'Aliyya 'Abd al-Sami al-Janzuri, *Imarat al-Ruha al-Salibiyya* (Cairo, 1975), 295-300, and Appendix 10, 386-395; Ibn al-Qalanisi, *Dhayl Tarikh Dimashq*, 279; William of Tyre, 2:140-143; Runciman, 2:235-236; Robert L. Nicholson, "The Growth of the Latin States, 1118-1144," in M. Baldwin, ed., *A History of the Crusades*, 1:446; Sir Hamilton A. R. Gibb, "Zengi and the Fall of Edessa," in M. Baldwin, ed., *A History*, 1:449-462; Segal, *Edessa the Blessed City*, 245-248; Said 'Abd al-Fattah 'Ashur, *al-Haraka al-Salibiyya*, 2:602-607; Ibn Wasil, *Mufarrij al-Kurub fi Akhbdr Bani Ayyub*, ed. Jamal al-Din al-Shayyal, 1 (Cairo, 1953), 49; Abu al-Fida, *al-Mukhtasar fi Akhbar al-Bashar*, in *R.H.C.*, 3 (Paris, 1872), 26; Yusuf al-Dibs, *Kitab Tarikh Suriyya*, 6 (Beirut, 1900), 67.
76. Said 'Ashur, *al-Haraka al-Salibiyya*, 2:608-609, and Hasan Habashi, *Nur al-Din wa al-Salibiyyun* (Cairo, 1948), 37.
77. The Anonymous Edessan, 137; Michael Rabo, 634 says Zangi was drunk and was killed on Sunday, September 15, 1146, Bar Hebraeus, 96; Ibn al-Athir, 1:453; Gregory the Priest, *The Continuation*, 244; Runciman, 2:239-240.
78. The Anonymous Edessan, 138.
79. Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, 1:457, and *al-Tarikh al-Bahir fi al-Dawla al-Atabegiyya*, ed. 'Abd al-Qadir Ahmad Tulaymat (Cairo, 1963), 86; Ibn al-Adim, 2:290, seems to follow al-Athir. William of Tyre, 2:158.
80. Gregory the Priest, 244-257; Michael Rabo, 637; the Anonymous Edessan, 138-148; Hasan Habashi, *Nur al-Din*, 74-76; al-Janzuri, *Imarat al-Ruha al-Salibiyya*, 359-371.
81. Michael Rabo, 642-643; the Anonymous Edessan, 152-153. On the monastery's treasures, see Rev. Bulus Behnam, "Dayr Mar Barsoum Qurb Malatiya" (The Monastery of Mar Barsourn near Melitene), *Lisan al-Mashriq*, 4-6 (Mosul, 1951): 153-208; and Bar Hebraeus, *Ecclesiastical History*, the biography of Michael Rabo.
82. Michael Rabo, 602.

83. Michael Rabo, 643-644. See Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, 97-98.

84. Michael Rabo, 725-727; the Anonymous Edessan, 187.

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85. Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, trans. Virginia Gingerick Berry as *The Journey of Louis VII to the East* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1948), 7.

86. See Virginia G. Berry, "The Second Crusade," in Baldwin, ed., *A History*, 1:463-512.

87. Charles Oman, *A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages*, 1 (New York, 1924), 260-261; Röhricht, *Geschichte des Königreichs Jerusalem 1100-1291*, 244-258; Habashi, *Nur al-Din*, 50-72.

88. Berry, "The Second Crusade," 1:490; Michael Rabo, 638.

89. Michael Rabo, 638; the Anonymous Edessan, 148; Bar Hebraeus, 97.

90. W. B. Stevenson, *The Crusaders in the East*, 158-160. G. Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State* (Oxford, 1956), 339; and Grousset, 2:227-228.

91. Michael Rabo, 641.

92. Ibn al-Qalanisi, 302-303. The name Yaghra appears in different forms and may indicate Bosra, as some writers assume. See Röhricht, *Geschichte*, 259, note 2, and Stevenson, 165, note 3.

93. Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh*, 1:471; Ibn al-Adim, *Zubdat al-Halab*, 2:292; Ibn Wasil, *Mufarrij al-Kurub fi Akhbar bani Ayyub*, ed. Jamal al-Din al-Shayyal, 1 (Cairo, 1953), 114-115.

94. Michael Rabo, 645; Bar Hebraeus, 275 of the English translation; the Anonymous Edessan, 153-154. Cf. Hamilton A. R. Gibb, "The Career of Nur al-Din," in Baldwin, ed., *A History*, 1:515.

95. Al-Qalanisi, 304.

96. Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, 1:476, and *al-Tarikh al-Bahir*, 98-99; Ibn Wasil, *Mufarrij al-Kurub*, 1:120.

97. Michael Rabo, 646; Bar Hebraeus, 97; the Anonymous Edessan, 154-155; al-Qalanisi, 305; al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, 1:476; Wasil, *Mufarrij*, 1:121; William of Tyre, 2:198; Marshall W. Baldwin, "The Latin States under Baldwin III and Amalric I," in Baldwin, ed., *A History*, 1:533; Gibb, "The Career of Nur al-Din," in *A History*, 1:515-516.

98. Michael Rabo, 647; al-Qalanisi, 305.

99. Michael Rabo, 649; Bar Hebraeus, 98; the Anonymous Edessan, 154-55.

100. Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, 1:480-481, *al-Tarikh al-Bahir*, 101-103; Ibn Wasil, 1:123.

101. Ibn al-Athir, *al-Tarikh al-Bahir*, 162-175, and *al-Kamil*, 1:602-606.

102. Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, 1:588-589, and *al-Tarikh*, 169; Ibn Wasil, *Mufarrij*, 1:235. On Malih, see Michael Rabo, 695-696, 710-711; Bar Hebraeus, 105; the Anonymous Edessan, 176-177; and William of Tyre, 2:386-

- 387.
103. William of Tyre, 2:394.
104. The Anonymous Edessan, 169.
105. Michael Rabo, 705-706; the Anonymous Edessan, 168.
106. Patriarch Ignatius Yaqub III, *Dafaqat al-Tib fi Tarikh Dayr al-Qiddis Mar Matta al-Ajib* (Zahla, Lebanon, 1961), 88.
107. Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, 371, 374-375, and *Tarikh Mukhtasar*, 229-232, 282-284; Ignatius Yaqub III, *Dafaqat al-Tib*, 94, 96.
108. Michael Rabo, 712; the Anonymous Edessan, 187.
109. Bar Hebraeus, 99.
110. Baha' al-Din, *al-Nawadir al-Sultaniyya wa al-Mahasin al-Yusufiyya*, in *R.H.C. Or.* 3 (Paris, 1884), 4. This work was later edited by Jamal al-Din al-Shayyal (Cairo, 1964).
111. Baha' al-Din, *al-Nawadir*, 3:18-20, 26-27, 36-37, 40-41, 386.
112. Steven Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, 3:77.

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113. Runciman, 3:78. For more on Saladin's achievements, see Stanley Lane-Poole, *Saladin and the Fall of the Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Beirut, 1964), 370-401.
114. Ibn Shaddad, *al-Nawadir*, 3:8, 18; Bar Hebraeus, *Tarikh Mukhtasar*, 223, says that Saladin died leaving in his treasury only one Tyrean dinar and forty Nasirite dirhams; in *Chronography*, 121, he gives the total as one dinar and thirty-six coins.
115. Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, 121.
116. *Ibid.*
117. W. B. Stevenson, *The Crusaders in the East*, 206-208.
118. Ibn Shaddad, *al-Nawadir al-Sultaniyya*, 3:48.
- 119- *Ibid.*, 3:6; see Bar Hebraeus, *Tarikh Mukhtasar*, 212-213, and *Chronography*, 102.
120. Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh*, 1:561-562; Bar Hebraeus, *ibid.*
121. Ibn Shaddad, *al-Nawadir*, 3:42-44, Ibn al-Athir, 1:532-535; the Anonymous Edessan, 164-165; Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, 102.
122. Ibn Shaddad, *al-Nawadir*, 3:46; William of Tyre, 2:344-359, gives a detailed account of this expedition.

123. See Yahya ibn Abi Tayy, *al-Sira al-Salahiyya*, in Abu Shama, *Kitab al-Rawdatayn fi Akhbar al-Dawlatayn*, 1 (Cairo, 1870), 172. Abu Shama, 1:142-174, offers us the most detailed account of Asad al-Din Shirkuh in Egypt, derived from several Muslim sources, including Ibn Shaddad and Ibn al-Athir as well as Ibn Abi Tayy.
124. The Anonymous Edessan, 166-167.
125. *Ibid.*, 167.
126. Ibn Athir, *al-Tarikh al-Bahir*, 141-142; Ibn Wasil, *Mufarrij al-Kurub*, 1:168-170; Ibn Abi Tayy, in Abu Shama, *Kitab al-Rawdatayn*, 1:173; Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, 106, and *Tarikh Mukhtasar*, 215. For a thorough account of Saladin in Egypt, see Yaacov Lev, *Saladin in Egypt* (Leiden, 1998).
127. Ibn al-Athir, *al-Tarikh*, 124; Ibn Wasil, *Mufarrij al-Kurub*, 1:168-169.
128. Ibn Shaddad, *al-Nawadir*, 3:48; Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, 104; the Anonymous Edessan, 167; Ibn Wasil, 1:162-163; Ibn al-Athir, 140-141.
129. On this conflict, see Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, 1:134, and *al-Tarikh*, 158-159; Bar Hebraeus, 106-107; and Ibn Wasil, *Mufarrij*, 1:171.
130. Bar Hebraeus, 107.
131. Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, 1:578-581, and *al-Tarikh*, 156-157; Bar Hebraeus, 106; Ibn Wasil, 1:200-201; William of Tyre, 2:359.
132. Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, 1:580-581.
133. Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, 106.
134. The Anonymous Edessan, 167, 173; William of Tyre, 2:359.
135. Ibn al-Athir, *al-Tarikh al-Bahir*, 157.
136. The Anonymous Edessan, 173.
137. *Ibid.*, 170, says he was twenty; see Said 'Abd Allah 'Ashur, *al-Haraka al-Salibiyya*, 2:738.
138. Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, 107.
139. Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh*, 1:607-608, and *al-Tarikh al-Bahir*, 162.
140. Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh*, I:615-616.
141. Ibn Shaddad, *al-Nawadir al-Sultaniyya*, 3:59.
142. Michael Rabo, 712.
143. *Ibid.*, 713. Chabot translates this passage as "a dog that barks against his master." The Syriac verb used here means "to attack," not "to bark." H. A. R. Gibb, "The Achievement of Saladin," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, 33 (Manchester, 1952), 1:44-60, quotes the same passage from the French translation.
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144. Bar Hebraeus, 107.

145. The Anonymous Edessan, 179; Bar Hebraeus, 108; Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh*, 1:618-619; Ibn Wasil, *Mufarrij al-Kurub*, 2:24; Lane-Poole, *Saladin*, 138-139; Stevenson, 209-210; R. Röhricht, *Geschichte*, 365-367; Grousset, *Histoire des Croisades*, 2:620-621.

146. William of Tyre, 2:405.

147. Al-'Imad al-Isfahani, in Abu Shama, 1:258; Ibn Wasil, 2:24; Ibn al-Athir, 1:618-619.

148. Ibn Wasil, *Mufarrij al-Kurub*, 2:32.

149. Michael Rabo, 712-713; Ibn Shaddad, *al-Nawadir*, 3:59-62; Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, 107; the Anonymous Edessan, 179.

150. Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, 1:621-622; Ibn Wasil, *Mufarrij al-Kurub*, 2:32.

151. Bar Hebraeus, 108; Ibn Shaddad, 3:59-60; Ibn al-Athir, 1:621-622, says the Caliph's gifts reached Saladin through an envoy; Ibn Wasil, 2:33-34.

152. Lane-Poole, *Saladin*, 142; Stevenson, *The Crusaders*, 210; Röhricht, *Geschichte*, 365-366.

153. Michael Rabo, 712-713; the Anonymous Edessan, 178-180; Bar Hebraeus, 108-109; Ibn Shaddad, *al-Nawadir*, 3:60-62; Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, 1:622-623; Ibn Wasil, *Mufarrij*, 2:38-42.

154. Bar Hebraeus, 109; Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, 1:622-623; Ibn Wasil, 2:46; Yahya ibn Abl Tayy, in Abu Shama, *Kitab al-Rawdatayn*, 1:261.

155. 'Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, in Abu Shama, 1:263, 2:66.

156. Anonymous, *Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, trans. Helen J. Nicholson as *Chronicle of the Third Crusade* (Aldershot, 1997), 28.

157. Ibn al-Athir, 1:623-624; Ibn Wasil, 2:44-45; Ibn Shaddad, 3:62.

158. Ibn Wasil, 2:48; Ibn al-Athir, 1:626.

159. Al-Isfahani, in Abu Shama, 2:240.

160. Ibn al-Athir, 1:619-620.

161. Michael Rabo, 612; Bar. Hebraeus, 108; G. Schlumberger, *Renaud de Chatillon* (Paris, 1898), 144.

162. Michael Rabo, 613.

163. William of Tyre, 2:412-413; Marshall Withed Baldwin, *Raymond III of Tripolis and the Fall of Jerusalem, 1140-1187* (Princeton, 1936), 30.

164. Ibn al-Athir, 1:620.

165. Ibn Wasil, *Mufarrij*, 2:115.
166. Al-'Imad al-Isfahani, in Abu Shama, 2:32-33; Ibn Wasil, 2:119; Ibn al-Athir, 1:656.
167. Ibn Shaddad, 3:69-70.
168. Bar Hebraeus, 111; Ibn al-Athir, 1:656; al-Isfahani, 2:31-33; Runciman, 2:434.
169. Bar Hebraeus, *ibid.*; Ibn al-Athir, 1:657; al-Isfahani, *ibid.*; Ibn Shaddad, 3:70; the Anonymous Edessan, 194.
170. Bar Hebraeus, 111-112; William of Tyre, 2:490; al-Isfahani, 2:42; Ibn al-Athir, 1:661; R. Grousset, *Histoire des Croisades et du Royaume Franc de Jerusalem*, 2:720.
171. Bar Hebraeus, 112; Ibn al-Athir, 1:662; al-Isfahani, 2:42, 45.
172. Bar Hebraeus, 113; al-Isfahani, 2:64-66; Ibn Wasil, 2:171-173.
173. Ibn Shaddad, 3:87.
174. William of Tyre, 2:419; Stevenson, *The Crusaders*, 216; E. J. King, *The Knights Hospitallers in the Holy Land* (London, 1931), 105.
175. Ibn al-Athir, 1:630; William of Tyre, 2:426. On the fate of Gumushtegin, governor of Harim, see Michael Rabo, 719, and the Anonymous Edessan, 189-190.

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176. Ibn al-Athir, 1:632; the Anonymous Edessan, 191; Michael Rabo, 719-720; Bar Hebraeus, 117.
177. Michael Rabo, 717-718.
178. The Anonymous Edessan, 188; Michael Rabo, 718-719; Bar Hebraeus, 109; Ibn al-Athir 1:628; William of Tyre, 2: 426-427; al-Isfahani, 1:273; Ibn Wasil, 2:59.
179. Ibn Shaddad, 3:6.3-64; al-Isfahani, 1:273; Ibn Wasil, 2:59; William of Tyre, 2:432-433; Röhricht, 377, n. 1; Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, 1:628-629; Ernoul, *Chronique D'Ernoul et de Bernard le Tresorier*, ed. M. L. DeMas Latrie (Paris, 1871), 43.
180. Michael Rabo, 719-720; Bar Hebraeus, 109; William of Tyre, 2:437; al-Isfahani, 2:6, 11, 13; Ibn Wasil, 2:72. The site is called Bayt al-Ahzan (the House of Sorrows) because it is believed to be the place where Jacob wept for his missing son Joseph.
181. Ibn al-Athir, 1:636; Stevenson, *The Crusaders*, 221.
182. William of Tyre, 2:443-444.
183. See al-Qadi al-Fadil's letter to the Wazir at Baghdad in Abu Shama, 2:14.
184. Stevenson, 222, n. 1.



185. William of Tyre, 2:447.

186. See Peter W. Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem and the Third Crusade* (Aldershot, 1996), 13-14, 24-25. Edbury's work is largely a translation of *The Continuation of William of Tyre: Ambroise, The Crusades of Richard Lion-Heart*, trans. Merton Jerome Hubert (New York, 1976), 120-21. This work was previously translated into prose as *The History of the Holy War*. See Edward Noble Stone, *Three Old French Chronicles of the Crusades* (Seattle, 1939), 42.

187. William of Tyre, 2:492-493; M. W. Baldwin, "The Decline and Fall of Jerusalem, 1174-1189," in *A History of the Crusades*, 1:603-605, and *Raymond III of Tripolis*, 69-97; *L'Histoire d'Eracles*, in *R.H.C.* 3, 2:25-28; R. Grousset, 2: 766-767.

188. Letter by al-Qadi al-Fadil, in Abu Shama, 2:66.

189. William of Tyre, 2:493-494; Ernoul, 146, 158; and *L'Histoire d'Eracles*, 2:40-41, 47-48.

190. Al-Isfahani, 2:76, 81; Ibn Wasil, 2:188. On the movements of Saladin, see Benjamin Z. Kedar, "The Battle of Hattin Revisited," in Benjamin Z. Kedar, ed., *The Horns of Hattin* (Jerusalem and London, 1992), 193, and Hamilton A. R. Gibb, "The Rise of Saladin, 1169-1189," in Baldwin, ed., *A History of the Crusades*, 1:585.

191. Malcolm Cameron Lyons and D. E. P. Jackson, *Saladin: The Politics of the Holy War* (Cambridge, 1990), 256.

192. *De Expugnatione Terrae Sanctae per Saladinum Libellus*, ed. Josephus Stevenson (London, 1875), 218. There is disagreement about the numbers of forces on both sides. See Röhricht, 430, n. 5, and Stevenson, 243. Nicholson, *Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, 31, cites a Latin source giving the number of Muslim forces as 500,000.

193. Ibn al-Athir, 1:679-680.

194. Baldwin, *Raymond III of Tripolis*, 84, n. 25. On Raymond's treachery, see also Nicholson, 31; Ambroise, *The Crusade of Richard Lion-Heart*, 122; and Edward Noble Stone, *Three Old French Chronicles*, 42.

195. Baldwin, 109.

196. Bar Hebraeus, 114; *De Expugnatione*, 221-222; Ernoul, 159-160; *L'Histoire d'Eracles*, 49-51; Grousset, 2:791-792; Charles Oman, *A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages*, 1 (New York, 1924), 326; Baldwin, *Raymond III*, 110-111; Runciman, 2:455; W. B. Stevenson, 244-45; Ibn al-Athir, 1:682.

197. Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, 32; Ernoul, 161-162; *L'Histoire d'Eracles*, 52-54, and the English version by Baldwin, 11; and R. C. Smail, "The Predicaments of Guy

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of Lusignan," in B. Z. Kedar, H. E. Mayer, and R. C. Smail, eds., *Outremer: Studies in the History of the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Jerusalem, 1982), 173.

198. Fr. Joseph Michaud, *Histoire des Croisades*, 2 (Paris, 1817-1822), 282-283.

199. *L'Histoire d'Eracles*, 63-64; Ernoul, 159-160; Baldwin, *Raymond III*, 119.

200. Al-Isfahani, 2:77; Ibn al-Athir, 1:683.
201. Bar Hebraeus, 114; Ibn Shaddad, 3:94.
202. Ibn al-Athir, 1:683-684; Ibn Shaddad, 3:95.
203. Bar Hebraeus, 115.
204. Baldwin, 134-135; the Anonymous Edessan, 199; Bar Hebraeus, 114-115; Ibn Shaddad, 3:94-95; Ibn al-Athir, 1:687; al-Isfahani, 2:79-80; R. Röhrich, 441; R. Grousset, 2:800; Edbury, 46-47; Nicholson, 25-26.
205. The Anonymous Edessan, 198.
206. Michael Rabo, 734.
207. Ibn al-Athir, 1:647.
208. Edbury, 48.
209. Michael Rabo, 734. Bar Hebraeus, 115, gives the number as 80; the Anonymous Edessan, 198, sets it at 150. Ibn al-Athir, 1:688, says Saladin executed the Templars and Hospitallers because he feared their power.
210. Edbury, 55-57; Ernoul, 174-75, 186-87, 215-24.
211. Michael Rabo, *ibid*.
212. See Edbury, 57, and Lane-Poole, *Saladin*, 232-33.
213. The Anonymous Edessan, 200-201; Armala, *al-Hurub*, 187. See Bar Hebraeus, 116.
214. Michael Rabo, 734-35; Bar Hebraeus, 327; the Anonymous Edessan, 199; Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, 2:471.
215. Michael Rabo, 736; the Anonymous Edessan, 199, says that Frederick drowned in a lake; Bar Hebraeus, 118, says the aged German king (Barbarossa) went to the river to swim, but since it was very cold that day, he fell ill and died, whereupon his son carried his body to Antioch.
216. The Anonymous Edessan, 202; Ambroise, *The Crusade*, 142-143. Bar Hebraeus, 119-120, sets the number of Muslims killed both in and outside Acre at 1800. On the occupation of Acre, see Ibn Shaddad, 3:238-240; al-Isfahani, 2:188; Ibn Wasil, 2:360; Röhrich, pp. 514-515, 519, 619.
217. Michael Rabo, 737; Bar Hebraeus, 121; Edbury, 1124-1126; Röhrich, 616.
218. Bar Hebraeus, 120.
219. Michael Rabo, 737, says it was for three years; Ibn al-Athir, 2:65, says three years and eight months. The Anonymous Edessan, 202, also mentions the peace agreement.
220. Ibn al-Athir, 2:68.

221. Saladin died March 3, 1193, in Damascus. See Michael Rabo, 737; Bar Hebraeus, 121, and *Tarikh Mukhtasar*, 223. The Anonymous Edessan, 202, states (unlike other Syriac sources) that Saladin died while besieging Arzun, in the district of Akhlat (Khilat). See Röhricht, 655, 657. Among the Arabic sources, see Ibn Shaddad, 3:368, and Ibn al-Athir, 2:72. Abu Shama, 2:213 and Ibn Wasil, 2:420, follow Ibn Shaddad's account.

222. Ibn al-Athir, 2:175; Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, 140, and *Tarikh Mukhtasar*, 244.

223. Abu al-Fida, *al-Mukhtasar fi Akhbar al-Bashar*, in *R.H.C. Or.*, 1:104-105, 122.

224. Bar Hebraeus, 148, and *Tarikh Mukhtasar*, 258-259; Ibn al-Athir, 2:200-204; Abu al-Fida, 1:128; Runciman, 3:264-271; T. A. Archer and Charles L. Kingsford, *The Crusades*, 398.

225. Philip Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, 10th ed. (New York, 1970), 658.

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